

DHARMAKIRTI'S THEORY OF INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE . A STUDY IN NYĀYABINDU

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by
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
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One of the major Indian logicians whose work has not received the kind of scholarly attention such a thinker deserves is undoubtedly Dharmakīrti. In his various logical treatises Dharmakīrti is primarily concerned with the epistemological and logical problems concerning man's worldly experience. In the present study an attempt is made to examine and explicate Dharmakīrti's understanding of the nature of inferential knowledge mainly in the light of *Nyāyabindu*. An attempt is also made to distinguish various ontological and epistemological presuppositions of his theory of inference.

The present thesis comprises six chapters.

Chapter I sketches the development of Indian logic with special reference to the problem of inference (*anumāna*). Prior to Dignāga, in Buddhist as well as in non-Buddhist traditions of logic, inference was treated as a second source of knowledge - second in order and in importance to

sense-perception This view is not acceptable to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti According to Dharmakīrti, since the reality knowledge presents has a double character it has two sources: the direct and the indirect While perception, the direct source of knowledge, cognises only the direct reality, the ultimate particular (*svalaksana*), the indirect or the generalized reality (*sāmānya-laksana*) is cognised by inference alone Hence according to Dharmakīrti, perception cannot be placed on a higher rank as a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). As *pramāṇa*, both perception and inference are equally important in their respective spheres.

Chapter II deals with the problem of *svalaksana* (ultimate particular) In order to define the perceptual domain of knowledge as opposed to the inferential, it is pertinent to ask what do we really perceive ? According to Dharmakīrti, the object of perception is *svalaksana* (particular). Each particular for him is an ultimate and is unique to each moment Dharmakīrti postulates the following main criteria for each particular (i) it is causally efficient or it can function, (ii) it is unique or dissimilar, and (iii) it cannot be captured by linguistic form If any or all of the above is not applicable to something, then that thing cannot be a particular The concept of *svalaksana* is analogous in many respects to 'sense-data' of Bertrand Russell and C D. Broad, 'sense-datum' of H H Price and 'vorstellungen' of Immanuel Kant

Chapter III is devoted to various issues such as the criteria of knowledge, the interrelationship between the perceptual and the inferential domains of knowledge, the relationship between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, etc. have been discussed at some length. In this context certain ontological presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's theory have also been stated

Chapter IV deals with the meaning of inferential knowledge and with various necessary and sufficient conditions of inference as expounded by Dharmakīrti. The significance of and the rationale for the distinction Dharmakīrti makes between 'inference for oneself' (*svārthanumāna*) and 'inference for others' (*parārthanumāna*) are discussed. Also discussed are the necessary and/or sufficient structural conditions which must be satisfied in order that an indirect cognition is counted as an inferential cognition. Dharmakīrti postulates that *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* are the three necessary constituents of inference.

Chapter V is divided into three sections. The first provides a discussion of the nature and the role of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*. Though *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* are given as the necessary constituents of inference it is essential to link them with the help of the two conditions, namely, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*. If *vyāpti* establishes the connection between *sādhya* and *hetu*, the *pakṣadharmatā* establishes the connection

between *pakṣa* and *hetu*. For Dharmakīrti *vyāpti* has a special status in defining the logic of inference. *Hetu* plays a central role in his theory. The validity of an argument is determined by the *trairūpya* (of *hetu*), i.e. the three features of *hetu* *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-sattva*. The second section of this chapter deals with the validity conditions of inference. The third discusses Dharmakīrti's rationale and basis for positing *svabhāvanumāna*, *kāryanumāna* and *anupalabdhi-anumāna* as three distinct kinds of inference.

The last chapter - Chapter VI - works out the general implications of certain salient features of the theory and also offers a brief account of the significance and limitation of the present study.

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DSrivastava

(Dinesh Chandra Srivastava)

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CHAPTER - I

Historical Introduction

The philosophy of Buddhism occupies a prominent place in classical Indian Philosophical thought. Its contribution to Indian metaphysics and epistemology is quite significant and has been aptly commented upon. Its unique theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* has few parallels in giving a wholly novel turn to the understanding of causality. Its doctrines of *anattavāda* and *śūnyavāda* have been understood as severe critique of Vedāntic thought and, therefore, have also been seriously refuted by the Vedāntins. At the same time these views have been compared with those of Heraclitus and Hume. Buddhism has indeed given rise to rival idealistic and realistic strands of thought in Indian Philosophy. At the same time it has also greatly enriched Indian logic by freeing logic from any extraneous considerations of ontology, epistemology and psychology.

Following Dignāga, Buddhist logicians recognise perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as the only means of valid knowledge. The main constituent of an inference is called *vyāpti*, a term referring to the relation that holds between the *hetu* and *sādhya*. Unlike the Nyāya tradition in which *vyāpti* is understood as a relation (*sambandha*), in the Buddhist tradition *vyāpti* means a rule (*niyam*) that governs the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. The rule called *vyāpti* is unexceptionable or never failing and hence holding necessarily (*avinābhāva*).

The Buddhist logicians have made numerous other contributions to logic, particularly in connection with the multiplicity of the concept of negation. Interesting discussions take place on the concept of *prasanga* (*reductio ad absurdum*). The Buddhist distinction between the thing itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) to which a word indirectly refers and the mental image (*vikalpa*) the word connotes is reminiscent of the modern Western distinction between denotation and sense.

Discussion on the problem of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge or means of valid knowledge) available prior to the advent of Dignāga is almost of negligible importance. The *Vigraha-Vyāvartini* of Nāgārjuna questions the very existence of *pramāṇa*. He adds that even if the existence of *pramāṇa* is granted, it would still be incompetent to prove anything. No work done before Dignāga deals with the problems of *pramāṇa* exclusively. The new method of Dignāga is followed by the followers of Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist systems. Dharmakīrti, the successor of Dignāga, analyses the views of Dignāga thoroughly and carefully. In course of time, the *Pramāṇa-Vārttika* and other works by Dharmakīrti become popular and occupy a prominent place in the Buddhist learning. Dharmakīrti becomes a renowned successor of Dignāga in all spheres by giving a new shape to the dialectical tradition of Dignāga.

The present work is devoted to the problem of inference dealt with by Dharmakīrti, one of the most systematic Buddhist

philosophers. In Buddhist thought *anumāna* (inference) is accepted as one of the important *pramānas*. In this work an attempt is made to briefly assess Dharmakīrti's unique position in Indian Philosophical thought, especially with reference to the theory of *anumāna*. However, a detailed enquiry into the problem of *anumāna* in general is not the principal task of the present work. Instead we are interested in Dharmakīrti's theory of *anumāna* as it is outlined in his various works. In order to articulate it and present its salient features it is essential to take into account a number of his well known treatises, like *Pramāṇa-Vārttika*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Hetubindu* etc. Nonetheless, his *Nyāyabindu* has a peculiar interest for us. Hence we shall primarily be concerned with the problems and issues raised and discussed in *Nyāyabindu*. The problems of *anumāna* are discussed in greater detail in *Pramāṇa-Vārttika* and *Hetubindu* etc. and therefore we shall refer to them whenever it is deemed necessary.

It is important to note here that the different schools of classical Indian philosophy have not flourished in isolation from one another. Rather, they have flourished simultaneously and philosophers of the same or different schools interact dialectically with one another and thereby exercised influence upon one another. Debates are held between different schools of philosophers on different issues. In such debates, it is not merely the philosophers or their schools or particular problems that matter as much as the perspective from which the problems are raised. And the conceptual framework reflected in the thought

of a particular philosopher also plays an important role. Amongst the prolonged and philosophically illuminating controversies and debates carried on in Indian philosophical thought, the one between Nyāya and Buddhism occupies a significant place. In the present study we shall focus attention on some of the important controversial points in respect of the problem of *anumāna*.

Historical Sketch of the Development of Indian Logic with Special Reference to the Problem of *Anumāna*:

Indian logic is commonly associated with the names of Gautam and Gangesh, followed by a host of commentators or sub-commentators. The *Nyāya-Sūtras* of Gautama with the *Bhāṣyā* of Vātsyāyan, the *Vārttika* of Uddyotakara and the *Tātparyā-tīkā* of Vācaspati and some other sub-commentaries constitute what is generally designated as the old school of Nyāya logic. The *Tattvaśintāmanī* of Gangesha with its innumerable commentaries and sub-commentaries is the basis of the modern school of Nyāya logic. A closer examination of Indian literature would show that not only these two but all the schools of Indian philosophy have developed logics of their own in consonance with their distinctive metaphysics.

Buddhist logic which took its rise and developed along with Buddhist philosophy has enormously influenced Brahmanic and Jaina logics. All the schools of Brahmanic philosophers, howsoever at variance among themselves, are singularly at one in attacking the

theories of Buddhist logic, though each one has its own way of attacking that logic. The Jaina logicians have also attacked the Buddhist logicians. Consequently the problems of Buddhist logic provide an interesting study not only for their own sake, but also for the sake of the light they throw on the history of Indian logic as a whole

Logic as an art or a method of argument has been resorted to by men long before any systematic speculation on logic began. The question is therefore not one of logic or no logic, but of developed logic or primitive logic. It is only after philosophical speculations are more or less crystallised that proper attention is directed towards logic as a separate science. As the Vedas present no systematised philosophy, the Upanishads likewise are figurative in their expressions. It is for this reason that the Upanishads to which the germs of all later philosophical thoughts can be definitely traced, have little to say about logical problems. But the debates and discussions found in the Upanishads may be regarded as anticipating the logical systems that followed.

Upanishads, though they encourage debates and discussions, declare that truths regarding Brahman are not obtainable by argumentation alone.¹ It is also to be noted in this connection that a purely rational approach to religion or metaphysics is not

1. 'naisā tarkena matir āpaneyā' *Kāthopanishada*, 1.2.9. ✓

much favoured by the Brahmanic tradition. Though there are several references to the necessity and usefulness of logic as well as debates and discussions, nowhere in Brahmanic literature is logic appraised at its full value. Manu, for instance, urges that dharma is to be analysed by means of argumentation in conformity with the Vedas². On the whole the importance of logic has been emphasized, if at all, in concurrence with the beliefs and doctrines of the Vedas, whose authority was commonly acknowledged to be one of the several means of right cognition (*śābda pramāṇa*) in the Brahmanical schools of philosophy³.

The Buddhists do not accept the unquestionable authority of the Vedas. They lay emphasis upon the role of reason and individual experience in matters of religion and philosophy. Buddha lays emphasis upon individual experience. This tendency to appeal to reason and argument accelerates the development of logic. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇ's *History of Indian Logic* (1920) presents an elaborate account of Buddhist literature on logic, which was transported to Tibet and which remains uptill now buried in its Tibetan translations. Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabīndu* with the *Tīkā* of Dharmottara is the only complete and comprehensive work on Buddhist logic that has survived in its original

2. 'ārsam dharmopadeśam ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā yastarkenānusam-dhatte sa dharmam veda netarah'.

- *Manusmṛiti*, Chapter 12, Verse, 106

3. see Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920) *History of Indian Logic*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, pp. 36-39.

Sanskrit form In the present work, we shall make the maximum possible use of the Brahmanical and Jaina references to, and criticism of the Buddhist logical doctrines

The discontinuation of the practice of Buddhist logic is contemporaneous with the decline and fall of Buddhism in India during 1000 A.D. With the revival of Brahmanism, Brahmanic logic as tinctured with Buddhistic influence becomes the prevailing logical practice. It thus lays the foundation for the new school of Brahmanic logic known as *navya-nyāya*.

The history of Indian logic thus presents three stages of development. At the first stage logic remains at the background because, during this period, dogmatic philosophy and scriptural authority reign supreme. The second stage is characterised by a revolt against authority when logic is raised to the rank of philosophy and is on a par with it. At the third stage logic gets the upper hand over philosophy. Buddhist logic, it is to be noted, belongs to the second stage of this development.

Inference is considered to be the most prominent among the sources of knowledge. In the first stage of development of Indian logic, we hear very little about inference as a *pramāṇa*. During the Hīnayāna period the Buddhists seem to know nothing about inference. But in the second stage, when the teachings of the leading schools of Indian philosophy are put into systematic formulations and when the fundamental treatises of the schools are composed, inference appears as one of the chief sources of

knowledge. Before the advent of the Buddhist logicians, although it is considered to be a chief source of knowledge, it remained only second in order and importance to sense perception. In the beginning we have at our disposal two schools which though for contrary reasons deny inference as a source of real knowledge. The first of the two are the orthodox Mīmāṃsākās who deny it because for them neither sense perception nor inference is a source of cognizing religious duty ⁴ The second school is that of the Cārvākas, who deny it because for them sense perception is the only source of knowledge. For the Cārvākas, inference (*anumāna*) crucially depends on perception for establishing the concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*, i.e. *vyāpti*. Hence, they deny the status of being independent source of knowledge to *anumāna*.

The Jaina logicians use the *anumāna pramāṇa* for things which are *parokṣa* (indirect) and not *pratyakṣa* (direct), things which are not known to us in our direct observational confrontation with them. However, because of the way they develop their theory of *anumāna-pramāṇa*, it does no longer remain a theory exclusively of inference from the known to the hitherto unknown, but includes in its fold the theory of explanation and prediction as well. For example, from the observation of the rise of the *kṛttikās* they could make the prediction that the *Rohini* star will rise. Similarly having observed that there is a shadow here, they seek

4. Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, I.1.2.

its explanation in the fact, given the context, that there is an umbrella here. The reasoning pattern that the Jainas use include in general the following five steps (i) assertion of the proposition to be justified (*pakṣa-prayoga* or *pratiṣṭhā*), (ii) citing the reason or evidence (*hetu-prayoga*), (iii) employing a *vyāpti-vākya* together with an instantiative *dṛṣṭānta* or a paradigm case, (iv) applying the generalization to the particular case in question (*upanaya*), and finally (v) drawing the inference (*niṣamāna*)⁵.

Jaina logicians' *vyāpti-vākyas* or generalisations always carry the existential interpretation, and they could also be properly described as empirical generalizations, though, of course they are not of the cause-effect type. For, sometimes these generalizations are based on various grounds such as (a) observable connections like "If a man had a father, then he had a mother also", (b) analysis of the meaning of terms like "If there is no certainty here, then there is uncertainty here", and (c) the analysis of certain observable but essential properties of things like "If there is heat here, then there is no sensation of cold here".⁶

One important feature of the Jaina logic is its emphasis on the *pramānya* of the *vyāpti-vākyas* on which together with the

5. Vidyabhushana's (1920), *History of Indian Logic*, p. 23.

6. *ibid*, p. 190-191.

knowledge of initial conditions, depends the *pramāṇya* of *anumāna*. The Jaina logician observes that the generality of a generalization is not merely a conjunction of several observable instances, such that the knowledge of a *vyāpti-vākya* is not a matter of observation or *pratyakṣa*. Nor is it a matter of inference (*anumāna*), for *anumāna* itself is parasitic on a *vyāpti-vākya*. The Naiyayikas think that *tarka* is an effective instrument of the *pramāṇa* of a *vyāpti-vākya*. But this the Jaina logician denies. For if, he argues, *tarka* as the Naiyayikas conceived it, could not even take off without the necessary logical support of a *vyāpti-vākya*, how then could it be regarded as an instrument of the *pramāṇya* of a *vyāpti-vākya* itself?⁷ It just could not be. Like Bertrand Russell's⁸ acceptance of the principle of induction as a logical principle, the Jaina logicians also, in their attempt to solve the problem of the *pramāṇya* of a *vyāpti-vākya* look upon *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*, the sole function of which is to give us *vyāptis* which are to constitute the basis of *anumāna-pramāṇa*.⁹

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the joint system of logic and metaphysics stands identified with the commonsense point of view in the minds of both philosophers and common people. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

7. Bhāvasena (1966) *Pramā-Prameya*, Sholapur, p. 45.

8. Russell (1912) *Problems of Philosophy*, London, p. 103.

9. Vadi, Devsurī (1967) *Pramāṇa-naya tattvalokalankāra*, Bombay, p. 216.

epistemology is thoroughly realistic and empiricistic, laying emphasis on the primacy of perception as a means of knowledge. Although the Nyāya individually recognizes verbal testimony (*śabda*) and comparison (*upamāna*) as sources of knowledge in addition to perception and inference, the joint system is unanimous in according epistemological primacy to perception. In *Nyāya-Sūtras*, Gautama defines inference 'as knowledge which is preceded by perception'.¹⁰ It depends on perception for the knowledge of the mark or middle term or *linga* as subsisting in the *pakṣa* or minor term. It depends on perception also of the knowledge of *vyāpti* or the universal relation between the middle and major terms of inference. Perception is essentially of one kind, viz., that it is a knowledge of what is directly given to our senses. Inference gives us a knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses due to the knowledge of *vyāpti* or universal relations among objects. There are different kinds of *vyāpti* in the Nyāya view, and accordingly there are different kinds of inferences.

In the Nyāya tradition, inference is an organic whole with five constituents : *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharana*, *upanaya*, and *niṣamāna*.¹¹ Though the whole is constituted of its parts, it is not just a bundle of them but has its own status apart from them. That is why each *avayava* (constituent) is presented as a sentence

10. *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I.1.5.

11. *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I.1.32.

or a proposition According to Vātsyāyana, the number of constituents is determined by two factors - (i) the number of *pramāṇas* accepted¹², and (ii) the view that the conclusions of every argument should be yielded jointly by all the accepted *pramāṇas*¹³ This seems to have been influenced by *Pramāṇa-samplava*¹⁴ accepted by the Naiyāyikas According to the *Pramāṇa-samplava* theory, the same object can be either perceived directly or inferred indirectly. Since the Naiyāyikas accept four *pramāṇas*, the five constituents of *anumāna* are accepted on these two considerations Further, each of the four accepted *pramāṇas* is held to determine its respective constituent

Gautama has classified inference into three kinds *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*¹⁵ *Pūrvavat* is that kind of *anumāna* in which we have a prior knowledge of the effect on the basis of the perception of its cause *Śeṣavat* means the cognition of one thing on the basis of another or what is commonly seen. From this classification three main points can be drawn out - (i) this seems to be based on the presupposition that inference is nothing but knowing things in the world through the cause-effect relationship; (ii) inference is always from the perceived to the

12. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I.1.1

13. *ibid*, I 1.1, I 1.3, I.1.5

14. *Nyāya-vārttika*, I.1.1.

15. *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I.1 5.

unperceived, and (iii) the classification of inference is based on the illustrations of it.

The Mīmāṃsā school is primarily concerned with the exposition of sacrificial practices. Mīmāṃsā systematises the interpretations of Vedic expressions by means of *paribhāṣā* rules, which are often called *nyāya*. Though the Mīmāṃsakas are primarily concerned with the problems of prescriptions, in so far as they interpret most of the Vedic utterances as injunctions (*Vidhi*), they also realise, like other systems, of Indian philosophy, the need of logical works. Sabara's *Bhāṣya* is considered to be a great commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras* of Jaimini, the founder of the school. Sabara's *Bhāṣya* is further commented upon by Prabhākara and Kumārila. We find some discussions, on the problems and sources of knowledge in Sabara's *Bhāṣya*. Prabhākara has written *Brhata* and Kumārila has composed *Śloka-Vārttika* from the standpoint of the Mīmāṃsā. Prabhākara seems to be the first systematic philosopher in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, who discusses the knowledge related problems in greater detail. It is to be noted that Prabhākara is the contemporary of Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti. In its attempt to justify the authority of the Vedas, the Mīmāṃsakas elaborately discuss the nature of knowledge, the nature and criterion of truth and falsity, the different sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and other related problems.

Prabhākara admits of five valid sources of knowledge, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), authority or testimony (*śabda*), and postulation (*arthāpatti*). Kumārila who succeeds Prabhākara adds non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) to the five sources accepted by Prabhākara. In so far as inference is concerned the Mīmāṃsakas develop their theory more or less in the manner of the Naiyāyikas.

The treatises of the Naiyāyikas on logic and inference have considerably influenced the thought and language of the Vedāntins, who accept the Nyāya views in many respects without further discussions. The only independent and systematic work devoted to the problems of inference is to be found in the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, a seventeenth century scholar. This work is a very important manual of the Vedānta philosophy. In this work, the author establishes the means of valid knowledge from the Vedāntic standpoint and as such it contains refutations of the other systems of philosophy, particularly of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Following Kumārila, the Vedāntins believe in six means of valid knowledge, as mentioned before. In order to explicate the Vedānta views on inference it is necessary to state in full the general Nyāya views and the deviations of the Vedāntins from them. But our intention here is not to enter into a detailed discussion of this aspect. However, we point out briefly, in the

following some important differences between the two systems on certain problems related to the theory of *anumāna*.

In the Nyāya tradition, a cognition like "The hill has fire because it has smoke", is inferential whereas in Vedānta it is a composite experience being both perceptual in respect of the hill and inferential in respect of the fire.

It is accepted by most of the thinkers including Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that inference proceeds from the previous knowledge of an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between *sādhya* and *hetu* coupled with the knowledge of the *pakṣa* as characterised by the *hetu*. The *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* defines *vyāpti* as the 'co-existence of the major term with the middle term, in all loci in which the middle term may exist'.¹⁶ The Naiyāyikas say that one of the means for establishing the validity of a *vyāpti* is to institute the hypothetical argument (*tarka*) so as to ascertain that the rejection of the proposition in question would lead to a *reductio ad absurdum*. But the Vedāntins say that it is idle to think of testing the validity of a *vyāpti* with the help of a *tarka*, because *tarka* itself involves a *vyāpti* which in its turn has to be proved to be valid, and in this way it leads to *anāvasthādosa* (*regressus ad infinitum*).

16. 'Vyāptiścaśeṣasāadhanāśrayāsrītasādhyaśamānādhikaranyarupā'

There is another point of difference regarding the perceptual knowledge of *vyāpti*. The question is : how on perceiving a limited number of cases of smoke being accompanied by fire, can we conclude "All cases of smoke are cases of fire" ? The Naiyāyikas hold that when we perceive a single object, smoke, we perceive as inhering in it, the universal smokeness. This perception of a class, according to Naiyāyikas is technically known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*. According to this theory, the universal proposition "All smokes are related to fire" cannot be explained by the perception of particular instances of smokes as related to fire, for any number of particulars cannot make up the universal. For this we require a perception of the whole class of smokes as related to fire. We have such a perception through the perception of the universal 'smokeness' as related to 'fireness'. In perceiving particular smokes we perceive the universal 'smokeness' inhering in them. But to perceive 'smokeness' is to perceive, in an extra-ordinary way, all smokes so far as they possess the universal 'smokeness'. Hence, the universal proposition "All smoke objects are fiery" is given by an extra-ordinary perception of all smokes as related to fire through the perception of smokeness as related to fireness. On this theory the Naiyāyikas explain the possibility of the formulation of a general/universal proposition (or *vyāpti*) through perception.

Vedāntins reject the Nyāya theory of extra-ordinary perception for the formulation of general proposition. They offer

an alternative explanation. According to them, a general proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It rests on the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When we find that two things go together and that there is no exception to their relation, we may take them as universally related.

We shall now discuss, in brief, the foundations of Buddhist logic.

During the time of Gautam Buddha, it is to be found that there were people who put emphasis on *tarka* and *mīmāṃsā*. There are instances in the Pali canon of Buddha's entering into discussions with many Brahmins and ascetics. Buddha takes recourse to argumentation by analogy (*dṛṣṭāntā*). But though Buddha does enter into discussions with others he often warns the *Bhikkhus* against the maddening effects of debates and discussions, which were considered to be obstructions in the spiritual progress of man. But this attitude towards the science of debate undergoes tremendous change in the Age of Abhidharma, when Buddhism is raised to the status of a systematic Holy Order. Buddhism feels the need to increase the number of its followers. But it could be done only through discussion and debate. It regards it as an integral portion of Abhidharma and even includes it in the list of subjects necessary for the *Bodhisattvas* to know. Independent works, like *Tarka-Śāstra* by Vasubandhu, on the science of debate come into being. These works primarily discuss

the topics of *Jāti*, *nigrahasthāna* and merits and defects of debate. Actually the work *Tarkaśāstra* forms a link between the science of debate and the science of logic. It is this *Tarka-śāstra* that points out unmistakably the existence of the *irairūpya* theory before Dignāga. Regarding this text Tucci observes "whether the work is the *Vādavidhā* or a different one, there is no doubt that it contains ideas and doctrines which Dignāga finds before him and which in many places he refutes in his treatise and in other places he follows. It is still a *vivāda* (debate) text, but it shows an enormous progress upon the first attempts and mere catalogues of the older treatises, as we can see quite well when we compare it with the *vivāda* sections contained in Maitreya and Asanga"¹⁷ Thus we see that the science of logic gradually develops from the science of debate.

A comparison of these *vivāda* texts with the *Nyāya-Sūtras* and the *Cārika-saṃhitā* makes it clear that in ancient logical methods there exists no difference so fundamental as to distinguish the Buddhist logical method from that of the non-Buddhist systems. So, Dignāga successfully endeavours to establish an independent Buddhist logic in consonance with its metaphysical theories. Moreover, he realises that in order to establish a new doctrine, it is not sufficient merely to examine the views of other systems. He thus feels the necessity of examining the means

17. Tucci, G. (1930) *On Some Aspects of the Doctrine of Maitreyanāth and Asanga*, p. 81

themselves that are employed to examine the views of others. With this end in view he composes different treatises on logic from the Buddhist standpoint. The chief among the works of Dignāga, is the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. A generation after Dignāga there emerges the eminent logician Dharmakīrti, who has written several works on logic. His chief work is the *Vārttika* on *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. The *Vārttika* surpasses the original work in many ways. Dharmakīrti replaces Dignāga in all spheres of philosophy. Hence, one can maintain that Dharmakīrti has given a new shape to the Dignāga's tradition.

Prior to Dignāga, the schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā generally consider inference to be the second source of our knowledge of the empirical world (the first source being perception). Perception has been placed on a higher rank as a valid source of knowledge. They hold this probably on the ground that perception gives us an immediate knowledge of things and also supplies the data of inference. The Nyāya school defines inference as a cognition "preceded by sense perception"¹⁸. This is interpreted as a cognition whose first step is "a perception of the connection between the reason and its consequence"¹⁹. The Sāṃkhyas maintain that "when some connection has been perceived

18. *Nyāya-sūtras*, I.1.5

19. *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 46.8.

the establishment of another fact is inference"²⁰ The definition of the Vaiśeṣikas simply states that inference is produced by the mark (of the object)²¹.

Dignāga criticises every word of these definitions. He says that "a connection is never cognised through the senses"²². Inference, according to him deals with concepts, i.e., with the general, and "the general cannot be seen"²³, that is, it cannot enter into us through senses. This view is a direct consequence of defining sense perception in terms of pure sensation. Sense perception, for Dignāga, is not the chief source of knowledge, in regard of which inference is a subordinate source, second in order and importance. Rather both the sources have equal rights. Inference in this context means understanding in general as contrasted with sensibility. The senses alone yield no definite knowledge at all. This seems to have been the view of Dignāga, a view which he does not succeed in formulating definitely and which is later formulated by Dharmakīrti.

According to Dharmakīrti, knowledge has two sources because the reality it presents has a double character. One of these two aspects or faces of reality is transcendental, the

20. This definition is to be found in *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 59 17.

21. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, IX 2 1

22. 'na sambandha indriya grhyate', *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, II. 28.

23. 'na sāmānyam drsyate', *ibid*, II. 29.

thing-in-itself (*paramārtha-sat*) the ultimate particular (*śvalakṣaṇa*), the point instant (*kṣaṇa*), the direct (*pratyakṣa*), while the other aspect is the empirical or phenomenal (*saṃvṛtti-sat*) constructed by the imagination (*saṃvikalpa*) and generalized (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), the indirect. This double-faced reality is therefore cognized by two different modes of knowledge, namely, perception and inference. Thus the epistemic scope of the one mode is distinct from the epistemic scope of the other. While perception (*pratyakṣa*), the direct source of knowledge, cognizes only the direct reality, the ultimate particular (*śvalakṣaṇa*), it can never cognize the indirect or constructed and generalized reality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Since it is called pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*) it can only grasp the ultimate particular. It is free from the slightest tinge of imagination. On the other hand, inference (*anumāna*) which is an indirect (*parokṣa*) mode of cognition, cognizes only the indirect reality - that which is constructed and generalized. It can never cognize the direct reality, the ultimate particular. On the point of the distinction of the epistemic scope of the different sources of knowledge, the Buddhist joins issue with the Nyāya scholars, who maintain that the different sources of knowledge overlap and penetrate within the limits of one another. The differentiation between direct and indirect knowledge, i.e., between perception and inference, is the cornerstone of the epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

Pre-Dignāga Indian logicians' contention that inference is preceded by a perceptual knowledge is sharply criticised by the Buddhist logicians. According to Dharmakīrti, *pratyakṣa* cannot be placed on a higher rank as a valid source of knowledge. As *pramāṇa*, both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are equally helpful in making us reach an object by virtue of their unfailing correspondence with the object. So, there is no reason why *Pratyakṣa* should be ranked higher than other *pramāṇas*. They are all equally important in their respective spheres.

In the following pages we have made an attempt to explicate and examine Dharmakīrti's understanding of the nature of inference mainly in the light of his celebrated work *Nyāyabindu* which is considered one of the most important works on Indian logic. We have tried to look into and distinguish various epistemological and ontological presuppositions of Dharmakīrti's theory of inference and also to see whether Dharmakīrti's theory confuses the latter with the former. There is indeed a close relation between a logical theory and certain epistemological and ontological questions. But to admit this is not to reduce logic to epistemology nor does it amount to equate logic with ontology. Dharmakīrti is very cautious on this point. In his discussion of *pratyakṣa* and, later, of *vyāpti* indeed questions of psychological nature and the relation between cognition and physical reality do arise but Dharmakīrti clearly recognises that all inference is based on a certain relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. It is the nature of this relation which is crucial to the logic of

inference. In order to appreciate and evaluate Dharmakīrti's views on the nature of *hetu* and *vyāpti* and the distinction between *svārtha-anumāna* and *parārtha-anumāna*, it will be necessary to look at them against the views of other schools of Indian logic of whom the Naiyāyikas are the most significant. Hence, we have tried to briefly explain the position of the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsakas on the issues which have been dealt with at length in Dharmakīrti's works. This should not, however, suggest that the present study is a comparative one. In the following chapters, we have mainly tried to bring out and discuss all the features, general as well as specific, of Dharmakīrti's theory of inference in the light of which a viable theory can be constructed. Attempt has also been made to see whether Dharmakīrti's approach does in fact seek to improve upon or revise some of the views expressed by his predecessors or contemporaries belonging to other schools in order to present a more defensible theory. The approach, therefore, adopted here can be termed syncretico-analytic. Finally, in our view the position held by Dharmakīrti can be defended against the criticism offered by his rivals.

CHAPTER - II

The Nature of *Svalaksana*

All the schools of Indian Philosophy have discussed the problem of the various sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) whereby the truths regarding the ultimate reality can be tested. The discussion of the doctrine of *pramāṇa* is regarded therefore as an indispensable preliminary to the main problems of philosophy. It has been a common dictum with Indian philosophers that the truth of what is to be known depends on the means of knowing it (*mānādhīna meya siddhiḥ*).

There is, however, much difference of opinion with regard to the various problems connected with the *pramāṇas* among different schools of philosophy. The Buddhist logicians have discussed the problems concerning *pramāṇas* under the following four heads (1) number (*samkhyā*), (2) nature (*lakṣaṇa*), (3) object (*gocara*), and (4) result (*phala*). According to the Buddhist logicians, *pramāṇas* are divided into two : (i) *pratyakṣa* and (ii) *parokṣa*. The Buddhists have, however, a specific principle of division for the two fold *pramāṇa*. All objects have two characteristics (1) self characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and (2) common characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Corresponding to these two there are two *pramāṇas* - *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* takes cognisance of the *svalakṣaṇa*, while *anumāna-pramāṇa* takes cognisance of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. It is also said, that *prameyas* or the objects of knowledge are either perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) or

imperceptible (*parokṣa*). Besides these two kinds, no third is possible and for these two kinds of *prameyas*, two different *pramānas* are necessitated, *pratyakṣa-pramāna* for perceptible objects and *anumāna-pramāna* for imperceptible objects

Svalakṣaṇa is the very basis of our knowledge, holds Dharmakīrti. It is unique. It is the reality which can be apprehended only through the senses. It is the ultimate reality and is the cause of our imagination (*vikalpa*)¹. It is the underlying substratum beneath all our empirical purposeful activities. It is devoid of every possible adjunct (*sarvopādhivivikta vastumātra*) and it is unutterable (*anabhilāpya*). Dharmakīrti says that in a perceptual process the cogniser apprehends the vision of reality which is 'essence in itself' and has no tinge of imagination or description. The vision of this reality is possible only when the senses of the cogniser are fixed on a particular point and all the speculative processes have stopped. Only after the apprehension of this reality the imaginative faculty stirs and tries to categorise what has been perceived previously². It is immediately and invariably followed by the conception³. The object of perception is a 'unique particular' says Śāntaraksita. It is beyond speech and imagination⁴. The non-conceptual character can be inferred by the

1. *Nyāya-Vārttika Tātparyā-tīkā*, p. 115.

2. *Pramāṇa-Vārttika* I 124-128.

3. *Nyāyabindu tīkā*, p. 4.

4. *Tattva-Saṃgrah*, Verses 1270-1285.

fact that its presence as a unique particular as something devoid of all its adjuncts is felt even at the moment when the attention of an apprehender is engaged at a place different from the place of apprehension⁵. The *Abhidharmasūtra* also supports the present view of the 'essences in themselves'. A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue but does not know that it is blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is⁶. On the other hand, the universal is a generalised image, a mere thought construction, hence it cannot be apprehended through the senses, and is in need of inference or conception⁷.

Nature of *Svalaksana* (Particular)

Dharmakīrti defines *svalaksana* (particular) as something whose mental image varies according to its nearness and remoteness⁸. It is the object of cognition which produces a vivid flash (*sphuta*) of consciousness when it is near and a dim one when it is at a distance⁹. Indeed, all external reality is experienced

5. *ibid*, Verse 731.

6. Stcherbatsky F.Th. (1962) *Buddhist Logic* Vol 1, Dover Publications, New York, p. 153.

7. *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, I.75.

8. *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā* p 1-13.

9. *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā*, p. 16, Lines 15-16

vividly when at hand and dimly when at a distance¹⁰. The 'particular' is not in need of universal to denote its subsistence as contested by the realists. The particular 'fire' is not in need of a universal 'fire' to denote its subsistence that 'it is fire'. The things are by nature mutually differentiated or "exclusive". Whenever a sense perception of a particular thing, e.g., 'fire' takes place, it takes place as differentiated from all the homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and, as in this perception we apprehend one definite thing with a definite form, differentiated from all other things, it naturally indicates that 'it is fire' and not 'a tuft of hair'.

An important question arises 'Is reality which appears vivid when at hand and dim when at distance reality at all? Does it not have two forms (a dim one and a bright one)?¹¹ How can it then be regarded as unique? The author of the *Tippaṇī* holds, that the dim or bright image of an object, for instance of 'blue colour', is not itself ultimate reality. In this cognition of dimness or vividness the essence in-itself is that factor which is the cause of these two effects. Indeed, it is the capacity or causal efficiency capable of producing the effect that ~~it~~ is the reality (*arthakriyā-ksamam vastu*). The vividness and dimness are based on our mental images produced from the unique particular. For instance, let us consider the case of 'fire'. First, there is

10. *ibid.*, Lines 16-18.

11. *Nyāya-bindu-tippaṇī*, p. 36, 37.

a general notion of 'fire' But every assumed or imagined case of fire is not real, but only that fire is real, which is capable of burning and cooking (*dīha kṛiyā Samartha*).

Dharmakīrti takes the particular in more than one sense : First, it is the 'existence as such' (*sanmātram* or *sattāmātram*). It denotes a stage when it has not been divided into the categories of subject and object, 'apprehender' and 'being apprehended'. Secondly, it is taken in the usual sense of the particular, according to which it is taken to be concrete particular, the pure *ālambana*, existence localised in time, space, beyond all mental constructions (*nāmajātyādikalpanā-podha*), but not beyond the conception of apprehender and being apprehended (*grāhyagrāhakakalpanāpodha*). In this sense it is the moment of efficiency capable of affecting our sensibility¹². Thirdly, it is taken in the sense of any concrete and particular object, because its substratum is the *svalaksana*, the 'essence-in-itself'

The term *viśeṣa*, a term commonly used for 'particular' has been frequently used even by the Indian realists But we must not confuse it with the *viśeṣa* or *svalaksana* of the Buddhists The realists have used this term to denote various meanings¹³ First, It is used to denote one of the seven categories It has an

12 *Nyāyabindu-tiṣṭhānī*, p. 19.

13. A detailed discussion of the term *viśeṣa* has been given by Shastri, D N. (1976) *Critique of Indian Realism*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, New Delhi, pp. 312-317.

objective reality. Secondly, sometimes it is used to denote an aspect of an object alongwith the universal. An object is considered to possess universal and particular attributes. According to Uddyotakara, there are three kinds of objects - *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and objects possessing both of them¹⁴. Thirdly, sometimes it is used to denote an 'individual' in which a universal resides. For instance, in an individual cow the universal 'cowhood' subsists¹⁵. Fourthly, sometimes, the term '*viśeṣa*' is used for universals other than *satā* viz *dravyatva* etc. as is evident from the words of Prasastapāda "The universals-*dravyatva* etc are called primarily *sāmānyas* inasmuch as they have many individuals, but they are also called '*viśeṣas*' in a secondary sense because they differentiate their substrata from others"¹⁶. Lastly, the term '*viśeṣa*' or '*antya-viśeṣa*' is used as a special attribute of an atom which differentiates it from all other atoms¹⁷.

The *svalakṣaṇa* of Dignāga (which means of its own kind or which has no similar of it in the whole universe) stands for an entirely different meaning. It is neither an individual nor a universal because both are relative terms and the creation of our

14. *Nyāya-Vārttika*, p. 92.

15. *Nyāyamāñjarī*, p. 286 and *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 315.

16. *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, p. 132.

17. *ibid*, p. 13.

language. It is neither an attribute of an object like redness or blueness nor an object itself like a tomato or a potato. It is not only shorn of all qualities, but is also shorn of duration in terms of time and extension in terms of space. It is differentiated and distinguished from every thing else in the world. Having no duration it is vertically cut off from all other reality in terms of time and having no extension, it is horizontally cut off from all other reality in terms of space¹⁸. It may simply be designated as 'ksana' or 'moment'. It is 'essence in itself' which admits ^{of} no description. It is this unique, unrelated, self-characterized real, having nothing in common with other such moments, emerging incessantly under the inexorable law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is directly experienced through the sense-organs¹⁹. Because of too much emphasis on the doctrine of 'particularity' in the old Vaiśeṣika system it may be speculated that the theory of Dignāga may perhaps have been partly influenced in its logical aspect by some views entertained in the school of the Vaiśeṣikas²⁰. But we must be very cautious at the time of drawing such conclusions. It is the genius of Dignāga which brought exclusive distinction between the particular and the universal and demarcated the sphere of their apprehension. It is

18. Shastri, D.N. (1976) *Critique of Indian Realism*, p. 343.

19. Mookerjee, S. (1975) *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Motilal Banarasi Dass, Delhi, p. 285.

20. Stecherbatsky, F.Th. (1962) *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 479.

he who declared that there are only two sources of knowledge, ~~the~~ perception and ~~the~~ inference. The apprehension of the *svalaksana* can be had only through perception while that of universals through inference

II

A question at this point may be raised : 'Why are the *svalaksanas* (particulars) alone the objects of perception?' According to the Buddhists, the particular is capable of evoking mental image and so it is regarded as the object of perception. Hence whatever is capable of evoking mental image must be an object of perception. But we know that 'universals' are not capable of invoking images. They are themselves, thought constructions. They are 'non-existence' and inefficient, they coalesce with words. At the time of perception they are not cognized, and at the subsequent stage when they are constructed by our understanding, the reality being evanescent has already vanished so that they cannot be objects of perception. Moreover, there are occasions when due to illusion or defects in the sense organs we may have conceptions which are unreal, e.g. the vision of mirage or the vision of a yellow conchshell. Therefore, every particular is not the object of perception but only that which is capable of producing an effect, and which is consistent with the normal human experience. Thus only that water is real which quenches our thirst and only that fire is real which burns our finger or cooks our food.

A further question arises 'why is the particular alone the ultimately real? The Buddhist answers thus . First, the universal or the general being non-existent is incapable of producing the desired effect, so no question arises regarding its reality. The only alternative is the particular and it serves the purpose, so it is the real. Secondly, only that thing is real which has the capacity to produce an effect. If a thing does not satisfy the criterion of 'efficiency', it is not real. The particular alone is efficient to produce the desired effect, so it is real. Thirdly, all our purposive actions are directed towards those objects which are existent. The 'particular' alone is existent, so it is real. The ideas of space, time, and causality are regarded as constructions of mind, but the unique particulars being their substratum are real²¹

The Buddhist theory that *svalakṣaṇas* are the objects of perception or indeterminate perception has invoked much criticism from Advaitins, Jains, Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They have advanced their own theories of objects of indeterminate perception which can be summarily stated as the following four theories : According to the first theory, the object of indeterminate perception is 'pure being' (*sannātram*) which is

21. *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*, 1-15.

'mahāsāmānya or *summun genus*',²² According to the second theory, the object of indeterminate perception is 'universal' or *sāmānya*. According to the third theory the object of indeterminate perception is *vyakti* or 'Individual' which is substratum of particulars and universals. According to the last theory, the objects of indeterminate perception are both 'particulars' and 'universals' although they are unrelated.

In order to clarify this controversy we will discuss these theories in the same order. The first theory is also upheld by Advaitins. They maintain that particulars cannot be the objects of perception. The knowledge of particulars depends upon the knowledge of their mutual differentiations or exclusiveness. This exclusiveness or differentiation is a property which is conceived by imagination and is the object of the understanding. In other words, the cognition of particular depends on the cognition of difference from other particulars. This difference is made by understanding and not by perception. So particulars cannot be objects of perception. Universals, again, cannot be the objects of perception because they are also formed by understanding out of the common features of different particulars. Thus in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension neither of the particular nor of the universal. The object appears in its true form which is the locus of both the universal as well as the particular. It is neither an individual object nor any or all of

22. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 98.

ts qualities; because individual objects and qualities require, the aid of understanding. It is 'pure being' or 'existence'.

The above view of Advaitins is rejected by the realists, who urge that "mere existence" cannot be the object of indeterminate perception as there is a distinct awareness of particulars in it. If indeterminate perception apprehends the mere being how can its particular characters be perceived? The existence of an object can never be perceived apart from its different particular characters. The Jaina philosophers make an attempt to retain the universal as the object of indeterminate perception. Their universal is not the 'great universal' of the Advaitins which is one and without a second. They propose that the universals are many and they are the objects of indeterminate perception. Sumati, a Jaina philosopher of Digambara school says that the particular is perceived only as infused with the characters of such universals as 'being' and is not perceived otherwise. Hence the particular is an attribute of the universal substantive. The (universal substantive) is capable of being perceived independently of all particulars. In this way there is no incongruence in the view that the universal is the object of non-conceptual or indeterminate perception²³.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that the view of Sumati is untenable. There is no difference between the universal and the particular in

23. *Tattva-saṃgraha-panjikā*, Verse 1279.

indeterminate perception. Hence the universal as different from particulars cannot be the object of indeterminate perception. If it is said that the particular is inseparable from the universal and this universal is taken to be the object of an indeterminate perception it is not universal. If it is inseparable from particular and the particular is inseparable from it, then there is no duality of the category of particular and the universal. So the object of indeterminate perception can neither be universal nor particular. According to him the object of indeterminate perception is an individual or *vyākṛti* which is the substratum of its generic and specific characters.²⁴ It is simple apprehension or 'bare awareness' of an object which becomes the basis of the objective consciousness which arises later on. This apprehension is similar to the apprehension of an infant and a dumb.²⁵ It is nameless and inarticulate. Here we are not conscious of its generic and specific characters because the processes of assimilation and discrimination which apprehend the generic characters of an object and which distinguish it from other objects are not present at this time. They involve memory of other objects and their differentiation from the perceived object which is impossible, because no objects other than the perceived one are present at the time of the indeterminate perception. The 'individual' or '*vyākṛti*' which is said to be the object of indeterminate perception is a concrete universal. It seems to be

24. *Śloka Vārttika*, 4.113.

25. *ibid*, 4.112.

different from the 'particular' and the 'universal' because it is their substratum. But such an individual is neither conceived nor perceived. It is not conceived because whatever is conceived is either particular or a universal. Further it is not perceived because whatever is perceived is not a connection or holding of the particular and the universal. If the individual is perceived, it is perceived as such. It is not perceived as the substratum of the particular and the universal. Again, if it is accepted that the individual is perceived as such and not as a substratum of the particular and the universal, such an individual is the same as the '*svalaksana*' of the Buddhists.'

Kumārila's views that the particular and the universal both are the characters of the object of indeterminate perception is equally untenable. It is not right to hold that one and the same cognition should apprehend the specific individuality as well as the universal²⁶. It is so because the cognition can be either 'conceptual' or 'non-conceptual'. If it is conceptual, there can be no apprehension of the specific individuality; if it is 'non-conceptual', there can be no apprehension of the universal. Moreover, Kumārila himself maintains that the universal is not other than the individual²⁷. If it is so, the universal cannot be said to characterize the object of indeterminate perception which is an individual. Individuals do not pervade over one another,

26. *Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā*, p. 387.

27. *Śloka-Vārttika, Pratyakṣa*, 141.

here is no pervasive entity which is given in perception. Therefore, the universal cannot be an object of perception. It is an object of understanding. Gangesa, the father of Navya-nyāya, has made an important addition to this criticism.. He says that indeterminate perception is non-relational. It is the cognition which is independent of the knowledge of the relation of the attribute and the substantive²⁸. Kumārila has taken indeterminate perception as relational because according to him it conveys the relation of the substantive and the attributive. Hence his views of indeterminate perception and its object are full of contradictions. Thus, Prabhākara, Pārthasārathi, Vācaspati Miśra and others have rejected Kumārila's views that the 'individual' or 'vyakti' is the object of indeterminate perception. The theory of 'vyakti' or something over and above the particular and the universal is Kumārila's beard which has been shaved by Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists with their Occam's razor, that is the law of parsimony or *lāghava-nyāya*.

The fourth view is held by Prasastapāda, Prabhākara, Pārthasārathi, Vācaspati Miśra, Śrīdhara, Viśwanātha and others. This is the theory which is generally maintained by Mīmāṃsakas, Nāyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. According to this theory, the object of perception is both the particular as well as the universal. The indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the particular and the universal '*svarūpamātram*'. In this apprehension there is no distinction between the particulars and

28. *Tattva-cintāmaṇī* I, p. 809.

he universals. The particulars and the universals are given in indeterminate perception as unrelated. It is non-relational and undifferentiated apprehension of the bare nature of an object²⁹. For instance, we may take the perception of a 'cow'. In indeterminate perception, the particular 'cow' and the universal cowhood, both constituents of the object 'cow' are perceived. But they are not perceived as related with one another as substantive and attribute. The apprehension as related with one another takes place later on when the processes of assimilation, discrimination, recollection, and recognition start their function of constructing the reality into a united whole. The indeterminate perception of an object is the experience of 'this is something'. It is the apprehension of mere 'this' and 'that'. It is completely devoid of the 'what' characters of the object, that is perceived.

The realists believe that what is known of an object after its perception is somewhat given in it. This is the reason that they hold the view that particulars and universals both are present in perception although they are unrelated and undifferentiated. Now the question is if particulars and universals are unrelated and undifferentiated in indeterminate perception how can they both be apprehended in it? Their dual presence is based upon relation and differentiation but indeterminate perception is non-relational and undifferentiated.

29. *Nyāyavārttika-Tātparyā-tīkā*, p. 108.

ence the object of indeterminate perception cannot be dual. It is either particular or universal. It cannot be both. Therefore, the realist view is inconsistent. They hold that indeterminate perception is non-relational and undifferentiated and that its object comprises both particulars and universals. This is their inconsistency.

The Buddhist view that the *svalakṣaṇas* are the object of perception appears to be quite convincing and credible. Its criticism by Advaitins and realists, is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of *svalakṣaṇas*. *Svalakṣaṇas* are not the individuals or *vyāpti* of Kumārila. They are not particulars as contrasted with universals. They are unique particulars and are beyond all comparison and contrast. They are self-revealing sense-data. They are not the particulars of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. Their particulars are contrasted or related with universals. They are categorised and are objects of understanding. *Svalakṣaṇas*, on the other hand, are uncategorised. The central points of Dharmakīrti regarding particulars may be summed up as follows. Each particular, according to him, is an absolute, which is unique to each moment. This has been called the Buddhist doctrine of 'universal flux'. Dharmakīrti notes the following criteria for each particular : (i) it is productive of effects or it can function (*arthakriyāsamārtha*), (ii) it is unique or dissimilar; (iii) it lies beyond the 'meaning' of words, (iv) it cannot be grasped by our verbalized cognition. If any of these criteria is not applicable to something, then that thing must be

called a universal. Particulars, not universals, are real in the ultimate sense. Reality, i.e. the particular, is inexpressible in language. Our speech reveals the world of universals, the world of construction. These two worlds, the world of particulars and the world of universals are completely separated in Dignāga's view. But if reality is unutterable and can only be perceived, our speech or words can never reveal or 'refer to' reality. However, there is an indirect way by which words can refer to real particulars. The way is possible by the *apoha* ('exclusion' or 'differentiation') doctrine. This doctrine can be summarized as follows. The function of a word or a name is the exclusion or elimination of other possibilities.

The sense-data philosophers in the west also hold a view similar to that of the Buddhists. These philosophers have also maintained that we never directly perceive material objects, but only sense data or sense qualities or even our ideas. Bishop Berkeley is the one who comes first to our mind, but there are other philosophers in the west, who hold the similar views. The Buddhist view that the bare particulars are unique point instants and always in a flux, and thus are beyond the reach of language, are also held in the same way by some logical positivists, like Otto Neurath. Otto Neurath asserts at some point that the 'given' can never be spoken of, and that we can never expect to compare reality with proposition and that we always remain within "the

phere of linguistic thought"³⁰. Reality stands in its own glory and is directly connected with our perceptual mode of consciousness where no speech intervenes.

The concept of *svalaksana* can further be compared with the sense-data of Russell or C.D. Broad. They are known by acquaintance. Perception is 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Here we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. For instance, in the presence of my table, I am acquainted with the sense data that make up the appearance of my table, e.g., its colour, shape, hardness, etc. Later, when we come to the knowledge of the table, it becomes, what is called a knowledge by description. According to Bertrand Russell, there is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table. All our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of the truths, and the actual thing which is table is not strictly speaking known to us at all³¹. Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance' resembles our sensation, but his division between the sense-data and the external object exposes him to the same criticism which Locke had to face.

30. Neurath, Otto in Ayer, A.J. (ed.) (1959) *Logical Positivism* (English translation), Free Press, Illinois, p. 291.

Cf. Wittgenstein : "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".

31. Russell, B. (1912) *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, London, reprinted in India (1984) pp. 25-27.

It may be stated that we can not be mistaken about what we
 ense, but we can be mistaken in our claim about the qualities or
 even about the existence of external objects. As H.H Price
 maintains, the term 'sense-datum' stands for something whose
 existence is indubitable - however fleeting it may be. This
 admission becomes wittingly or unwittingly the point of departure
 from all theories of peception To quote Price,

"When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt . . . One
 thing however I cannot doubt that there exists a red patch
 of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a
 background of other colour patches, and having a visual
 depth, and that this whole field of colour is directly
 present to my consciousness What the red patch is, whether
 a substance, or a state of substance, or an event, whether it
 is physical or psychical or neither, and the questions we may
 doubt about . . . But that it now exists, and that I am
 conscious of it - by me at least who am conscious of it thus
 cannot possibly be doubted. And when I say that it is
 "directly" present to my consciousness, I mean that my
 consciousness of it is not reached by inference, nor by any
 other intellectual process"³².

As Price maintains, the Ancients' 'sensible - species', Locke's and
 Berkeley's 'ideas', Hume's, 'impressions', Kant's *Vorstellungen* and

32. Price, H H. (1933) *Perception*, Methuen & Co., London, p. 3.

C.D Broad's '*sensa*' are the various names of sense-data³³. It is in the light of such a concept of sense-data that we should understand Dharmakīrti's idea of *svalaksana*. What is important here is to remember that sensing or experiencing the sense-data is not knowing anything by intellectual means.

It was a similar point which Kant made in the Transcendental Aesthetic of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Of course, Kant's main interest lay in clarifying the *a priori* or subjective forms of intuition, but in his attempt to explicate the nature of the content or the object of an empirical sensuous intuition, he also starts with an idea of 'representation' which precedes the cognition of objects in space and time. At places Kant also uses the term 'appearance' to mean the content of a sense intuition when this content is considered 'undetermined' and uncategorised (This use of 'appearance' should not be confused with its another use where it is synonymous with 'phenomenon'). In Kant's theory of perception, a distinction is maintained between the material element and the formal element. By abstracting from the total process of perception all that is contributed by understanding, Kant comes to analyse the nature of empirical intuition or perception in a narrow sense. Thus he comes by analysis to appearances or what we may call sense-contents or sense-data. These indeterminate sensations constitute the material element of sense-experience.

33. *ibid*, p. 19.

CHAPTER - III

Pramāṇa and Its Criteria : Ontological and Conceptual Issues

Dharmakīrti's philosophy centres around two basic considerations, namely, *svalaksana* and *sāmānya-laksana*¹. One can very clearly see that they are also the principal considerations of Dignāga's philosophy. On the basis of the available sources we can hold that though their basic considerations concerning *svalaksana* and *sāmānya-laksana* are the same, the ways in which they are interpreted and understood by both these philosophers are clearly different. According to Dignāga, *svalaksana* is by nature unique, particular and instantial. *Svalaksana* means that which cannot be defined by anything else except itself². It can be experienced just for a moment and that momentary experience is without any quality, namely, universality, etc. In other words, it is free from any characterization.

Sāmānyalaksana on the other hand, according to Dignāga, means that which is sharable, definable and communicable. It is

1. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* II 1.

2. This is the reason probably one does not find in Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* any definition of *svalaksana* nor does one find any definite description of it. But in his discussions on the nature of *pratyakṣa* one does indirectly though come across his views about *svalaksana*.

not, in principle, free from all mental constructions³. This does not, however, mean that it is purely unreal and strictly imaginary. It appears that Dignāga takes *svalaksana* and *sāmānya-laksana* to be diametrically opposed to each other. In our experience of the world, we find that somethings are purely *svalaksanātmaka* while others are *sāmānya-laksanātmaka*, and there is no interconnection between the two, since they differ fundamentally⁴.

Let us turn to Dharmakīrti's conception of *svalaksana* and *sāmānyalakšana*. Dharmakīrti's definition of the two concepts succeeds in circumventing the defects Dignāga's definition suffers from. Dharmakīrti defines the concept of *svalaksana* in a more refined manner. He asserts that *svalaksana* must fulfil two conditions *abhrāntatva* and *kalpanāpodhatva* (instead of mere *kalpanāpodhatva*) over and above its being unique⁵. It is to be noted here that Dharmakīrti characterises perception as 'free from conceptual construction' (*kalpanāpodhatva*) and 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*) in the sense that it is direct and total knowledge of an object (*svalaksana*). In this sense perceptual knowledge is taken to incorporate the perception of every minor detail and specific property of the object perceived. Not only *svalaksana*.

3. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* I.2, *Sva-Vṛtti*, pp. 6-7.

4. *ibid.* pp. 4-9.

5. *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*, pp. 16-17.

but *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* also gets a refined treatment and the way they are interconnected is also quite distinctive. *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* in Dharmakīrti's view, is sharable, definable and communicable. It need not be a product of mere imagination or something that is merely fictitious. The possibility of its being obtainable cannot be summarily dismissed. It would be real as well⁶. According to both Dharmakīrti and his predecessor, Dignāga, these two knowables, i.e. *svalakṣaṇas* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*, are real and irreducible. But for Dharmakīrti, while *svalakṣaṇa* is *paramārthā sat*, *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is *(loka) samvṛtti-sat*⁷, (discussion on the two types of *sat* follows in the next section). Dharmakīrti also spells out modes of interconnections between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* in a unique manner. He seems to relate the two through the perspective of *Mādhyamā-pratīpad* (the Middle Path).

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti subscribe to two different philosophical stances regarding the interconnection that obtains between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The two can be sought to be related in a number of ways. One can talk about two possibilities of relating the two. Firstly, one can accept them to be totally independent of each other, i.e. totally unrelated; secondly, accept the possibility of their convergence upon an entity. The first alternative seems to be accepted by Dignāga. For, according to him, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are totally

6. *Svārthanumāna-pariccheda*, pp. 15-16.

7. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* II.3.

different from each other because they are objects of two different and independent modes of cognitions, i.e. of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* respectively, there being no object at all that is cognized by both the *pramāṇas* either jointly or severally. Dharmakīrti seems to accept the possibility of their convergence on a single entity, although the features of it that are revealed through them cannot be the same. For, otherwise, there is no need of their being disclosed through independent *pramāṇas*. By accepting the possibility of convergence of the two features on a single entity the utter unrelatedness of *śvalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is given up.

In the very opening verse of *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti defines the scope and aim of logical investigation. The verse runs as follows : "All successful human action (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*) is (necessarily) preceded by right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna* = *pramāṇa*), therefore we are going to investigate it"⁸ A successful human action (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*) is connected with our knowledge which we acquire through either *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*⁹. *Puruṣārtha-siddhi* becomes possible through discrimination between accepting those things which are instrumental to it (*upādeya*) and rejecting those which are not so (*heya*).¹⁰ Such a kind of discriminatory knowledge emerges through both the modes of

8. 'Samyag-jñānapurvikā puruṣārthasiddhiriti tad vyutpādyate' *Nyāyabindu* I.1.

9. *ibid* I.1 and *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*, pp. 1-8.

10. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* III.218-219.

comprehension, namely, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, and over and above these two modes of comprehension there is none¹¹ Dharmakīrti seems to emphasise the need to discriminate between objects of perceptual and inferential cognition corresponding to the distinction between *heya* and *upādeya*.

Right cognition is successful cognition that is to say, it is cognition followed by determination or judgement (*adhyavasāya-niscaya*), which is, in its turn, followed by a successful action (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*). What strikes us in this definition of right cognition is its seemingly empirical character. Dharmottara¹² substantiates this point in what follows. Right knowledge is everyday right knowledge. It is not the cognition of an absolute, the cognition of the things as they really are, or the knowledge of the reality or unreality of the external world. Ordinary men in their daily pursuits perceive external objects by their senses, they are convinced of a necessary connection between these objects and their senses. Or they perceive the mark of something desirable which is hidden in a remote place, they are convinced of the necessary connection between the perceived mark and the concealed aim, they take action and are successful. Hence, we can say that Dharmakīrti aims at the *puruṣārtha-siddhi* which is held to be the supreme aim of human life because it is connected with

11. *ibid* I.63-64.

12. *Nyāyabindu-tīka*, p. 3.24.

our being human. For it is only in so far as the possibility of *puruṣārtha-siddhi* is left open in our life that we are said to live in an essentially human way

In this section we intend to study the epistemological aspects of Dharmakīrti's philosophy and try to locate the point of our present study in it with a view to preparing the necessary background for its proper treatment

Following the line of Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti upholds the *Madhyamā-Pratipad* (Middle Way) to be a trait of his philosophy. He holds that there are two sorts of truths, namely, *paramārtha-sat* (transcendental truth) and (*Loka*) *saṃvṛtti-sat* (empirical or practical truth). *Paramārtha-sat*, the truth concerning *śvalakṣaṇa* is cognizable through perception. On the other hand, it is inference which enables us to comprehend (*loka*) *saṃvṛtti-sat*, the truth concerning *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. In other words, according to Dharmakīrti, there are two kinds of knowables - *śvalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and they lead to two distinct sorts of cognition - *Pratyakṣa* (direct) and *anumāna* (indirect). Further, they are connected with two sorts of truth, namely, *paramārtha-sat* and *saṃvṛtti-sat*.

Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti seem to be right in recognizing the two distinct and mutually irreducible sorts of knowable. These two sorts of knowable can either be the heterogeneous features of an object or can themselves be different sorts of objects. In the former, objects are nothing else but collections of features and such features can be either unique and/or general.

If one accepts Dignāga's view that objects are only of two kinds and they are necessarily diametrically opposed to each other, it would mean compartmentalising the world into two halves. If an object is nothing else but a bundle of characteristics, then there are two possibilities (a) either there are objects with diametrically opposite characteristics or (b) the two sorts of characteristics are unrelated with each other. But either way there would be unsurmountable difficulties. Consequently, it would amount to compartmentalising the world into two distinct sorts of reals, which would not only be independent of one another, but unconnected as well. We shall now see how Dharmakīrti resolves this problem. It is to be noted here that the two distinct sorts of knowable Dharmakīrti talks about need not be construed as two different sorts of objects, but rather as two distinct sorts of features they may disclose through two different sorts of cognitions. Given this, it can be said that *paramārtha-sat* and (*loka*) *saṃvṛtti-sat* are two different kinds of truths correlative to the features disclosed respectively by *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.

Dharmakīrti does not subscribe to the epistemic dichotomization even though perceptual and inferential cognitions are of different kinds. Given that objects may have two principal sorts of features - *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, unique and sharable respectively in all the three classes of objects, (there can be (i) those objects having only unique features (particularity), (ii) those having only sharable features (generality) and (iii) those having unique as well as sharable

features. Given the third class of objects, it is perfectly possible to have knowledge of one and the same object from two different perspectives, namely, direct and indirect. Dharmakīrti accepts the possibility of the convergence of the two sorts of features on the same object. Thus if one holds Dharmakīrti's position, then the differences between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* need not be reconciled. If the possibility of their convergence on the same object is allowed the demarcation between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* would not force us to compartmentalise the world into two distinct sorts of objects. Likewise, the two truths around which Buddha's teaching revolves, namely, *paramārtha-sat* and *saṃvṛti-sat* could be coherently related to each other.

Two questions are important concerning knowledge - (i) how do we cognize whatever knowledge-claims we have? and (ii) how and on what basis do we justify our knowledge-claims? Cognition presupposes a means of cognition while the justification presupposes an appropriate procedure in terms of which we can justify our knowledge-claims. These are the two important issues around which quite a few vexing problems in epistemology revolve. We wish to note the response of Dharmakīrti to these two questions.

A question which has been generally asked concerning cognition is "How many distinct and mutually irreducible kinds of cognitions do we have?" Buddhist philosophers starting with Dignāga and including Dharmakīrti hold that we have two basic

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sorts of cognition : perceptual and inferential, which are independent and irreducible to each other¹³. Perceptual cognition enables us to grasp the *svalaksana*, while inferential, cognition enables us to grasp the *sāmānya-laksana* features of objects, and there are no features of any object which are neither *svalaksana* nor *sāmānya-laksana*. Since there are only these two principal kinds of knowable and since they cannot be cognized with the help of a single tool, there are two kinds or means of knowing them. According to Dharmakīrti, the number and nature of *pramānas* (means of knowledge) is determined by the number and nature of *prameyas* (objects of knowledge). Since the *prameyas* are two, *pramānas* also are two¹⁴.

The distinctness of two cognitions seems to be reinforced on a number of counts. (1) priority of *prameyas* over *pramānas* tells us that since the *prameyas* are distinct and irreducible to each other, the *pramānas* through which they are cognized should likewise be distinct and irreducible to each other, (11) Even if *svalaksana* and *sāmānya-laksana* are understood as two different kinds of features rather than objects and since their cognitions become possible through two distinct modes of cognition, the two modes of cognition as well as cognitions, they make available, remain

13. *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*, pp. 7-10.

14. *Pramāna-vārttika* II.1-3.

distinct and irreducible to each other, (iii) it may be held that after all we have two distinct sorts of cognition - one by acquaintance and the other by description. The first of these is direct, the latter indirect. Since these become available through two distinct means and reveal different sorts of features of objects, they are distinct and irreducible to each other. Consequently, Dharmakīrti accepts what is called *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* or *pramāṇa-viplava*¹⁵, according to which one kind of cognition can be had through one and only one means of cognition and since only two principal kinds of cognition can be had, two and only two means of cognition would enable us to make sense of the cognitive side of our epistemic enterprise. As against this, Nyāya philosophers and perhaps philosophers of some other Indian philosophical systems accept *pramāṇa-samplava*¹⁶, a doctrine according to which one and the same kind of cognition can be had through more than one means of cognition. However, we shall not go into this aspect of the Nyāya-Buddhist controversy. But we may note in passing that the Nyāya doctrine of preponderance of *pratyakṣa* over *anumāna*, their insistence that *anumāna*, must be based on *pratyakṣa*, that *bhūyo-darśana* (repeated observation) is the cognitive basis of our comprehension of *vyāpti* or their assignment of significant role to *udāharana* (exemplification) in

15. Stcherbatsky, F. Th. (1962) *Buddhist Logic* Vol. II, Dover Publications, New York, pp 299-308.

16. *ibid.*

anumāna seems to originate from their subscription to the doctrine of *pramāṇa-samplava*.

We have already noted that while cognition presupposes some means, justification of knowledge-claims presupposes a procedure. We have also noticed that according to Dharmakīrti, we gain two distinct sorts of cognition through *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* respectively. Any knowledge-claim would obviously be advanced on the basis of knowledge gained through these means of cognition. But the question is : On what basis are we entitled to justify a knowledge-claim we have advanced? There is a uniform answer to this question given by both Nyāya and Buddhism. The answer is that it is done on the basis of some other knowledge-claim (*parataḥ pramāṇyavāda*). It is obvious that this kind of transitivity of knowledge-claims is brought in to avoid the fallacy of circularity in attempting to justify a knowledge-claim on its own basis. They also accept similar procedure of justification, namely, of justifying one justifiable knowledge-claim on the basis of another reliable knowledge-claim.

There, however, arises a further question : On what sort of other knowledge-claim can we hope to justify a knowledge-claim advanced by us, when we are called upon to do so? Here the Buddhist and the Nyāya approaches are clearly different. In answer to the above question the Buddhists hold that it cannot be said "On the basis of any other knowledge-claim relying on which it could be justified, no matter how it becomes available to us". For according to Dharmakīrti, different and mutually irreducible

features of knowables are cognized by perceptual and inferential cognitions, and perceptually cognized features cannot be inferentially cognized. If any knowledge-claim that is advanced is put forth on the basis of appropriate cognition, then its vindication would also be possible only on the basis of the appropriate cognition, knowledge-claim. And now if a ↓ advanced concerns cognition made available perceptually, then its vindication should also rest upon another cognition made available only perceptually. It also applies to a knowledge-claim advanced on the basis of inferential cognition. Thus with regard to justification of knowledge-claims, Dharmakīrti upholds the doctrine of *pramāṇa-viplava*, as contrasted with *pramāṇa-samplava* upheld by Nyāya. According to the latter, a knowledge-claim advanced on the basis of perceptual cognition can very well be defended on the basis of cognition gained with the help of a different tool of cognition as well, since various tools of cognition can disclose the same features of a cognizable object. Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, perception and inference play a differential role both for cognition and justification and this is in accordance with *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* to which he subscribes. According to Nyāya, on the contrary, various means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) play a similar and an interchangeable role both for cognition and for justification. This position of Nyāya is in accordance with the doctrine of *pramāṇa-samplava* to which they subscribe.

III

In this section, we wish to discuss the criteria of *pramāṇa* advanced by Dharmakīrti. But before we come to this, we shall show that in Buddhist epistemology, *pramāṇa* is nothing but knowledge itself. There is no fundamental difference between a *pramāṇa* (knowledge) and its *Pramāṇa* (instrument of knowledge).

The epistemological thinkers in India have generally adopted a causal approach to knowledge. Every knowledge is taken to be an occurrence, an outcome of a particular causal complex (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*), in which the causal condition acting as an instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*) is known as *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* is the mode of knowing. The Buddhist thinkers do not entertain the distinction between *pramāṇa* and its outcome (*pramāṇa-phala* = *pramāṇa*) mainly because this distinction is not needed in their epistemological set up. As opposed to the school of Nyāya which maintains such a distinction because of its presupposition that *pramāṇa* is the ground for the truth of a *pramāṇa* (*mānādhīna meyasiddhiḥ*) which is its *phala* (outcome), the Buddhists repudiate this distinction because for them a reference to the object of knowledge (*prameya*) is the ground for the truth of *pramāṇa*¹⁷. Moreover, they maintain that no rigid separation is possible between the act of cognizing and the cognition of the object¹⁸.

17. (a) 'Savyāpāra-pratitativāt pramāṇam phalamevasat' -
Pramāṇa-samuccaya I 8

(b) 'Viśayākārataivaśya Pramāṇam tena miyaye' - *ibid* I 9.

18. *ibid* V.1.8 Hattori's translation, p. 28.

The generally accepted concept of *pramāṇa* is, however, derived from grammar. Every product requires several means of production. The means of production, the function of which is immediately followed by the effect, is called *kāraṇa* or the instrument of that product. Our knowledge, also being an effect, must require some instrument for its production. The product, knowledge, is *pramā* and the instrument of that knowledge is *pramāṇa*. The derivation of the word '*pramāṇa*' runs thus. '*pramīyate anena iti pramāṇam*'. The suffix '*lyut*' here is in the sense of '*kāraṇa*'. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, the relation of *pramā* and *pramāṇa* is only a type of the relation of causality, *pramāṇa* being the instrumental cause and *pramā* its effect. Since the effect is consequent to the cause, the cause and the effect must be different from each other. Thus '*pramāṇa*' the instrumental cause differs from the resulting knowledge, '*pramā*'. Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas accept this conventional concept of *pramāṇa* based on grammatical derivation.

Buddhist logicians, while explaining and defining '*pramāṇa*' do not stick to the grammatical derivation of the word. Every knowledge manifests a certain object. Thus every knowledge is characteristised by an objective bias (*viśayonmukhatā*). The object being cognized means its appearance in cognition. Knowledge takes the form of that cognizable object. When we perceive 'blue' a corresponding form of the object 'blue' is stamped upon our knowledge. It is this objective equiformity (*arthasārūpya*) that measures or determines the limit of perceptual judgement - 'this

is blue', and thus eliminates the objects other than 'blue' from the ken of perception. The cognition of blue which is thus measured is called *paricchedya*, and the objective equiformity of that cognition which acts as the measure or determinant is called *paricchedaka*. When one makes a distinct judgement - 'it is blue', the cognition is at once withdrawn from all that is non-blue and is fixed to the particular object 'blue' alone. This act of determination or fixation (to a particular object) is called *vyavasthāpanā* by the Buddhists. The cognition which is thus fixed is described as *vyavasthāpya*.

Dharmakīrti says that the object form presented in knowledge points to the object lying outside knowledge. This form correspondence between knowledge and object is technically called *arthasārupya* or equiformity (of knowledge with object). To know an object is to have it manifested in knowledge. This manifestation is done through the equiformity between knowledge and object. Different forms of object figuring in cognitions lead one to ascertain that there is contact with blue or there is contact with yellow. Hence this objective equiformity of knowledge is the *vyavasthāpaka* which determines the objective difference of our cognitions. It is in this sense that *arthasārupya* or objective equiformity of knowledge is called *pramāṇa*, which thus identifies the object to which the knowledge gets fixed and limited. So it is the measure of knowledge. Knowledge, thus measured, measures the object. *Arthasārupya* is thus the measure of both knowledge and object. The relation of

pramā and *pramāṇa* in the view of Buddhists, is not a relation of causality but a relation between a *vyasthāpaka* or *paricchedaka* which measures and a *vyavasthāpya* or *paricchedya* which is being measured. It is a relation between the ground and the grounded, the determinant and the determinable.

Prajñākaragupta¹⁹ brings out the implication of the concept of equiformity (*arthasārupya*) in the following manner. It is the objective form that determines knowledge as capturing the object. This object form assures me that I know the object. As long as the form of the object remains confined to the external thing it cannot be looked upon as given to knowledge. But when the external object confers its form upon cognition, it (the form) becomes *cognitive object form* which alone finally helps in manifesting the object as known to the knower. Properly speaking, this cognitive object form does not produce knowledge, but serves as the epistemic ground of knowledge. In short, I can know an object only in so far as I can 'feel' like having the form of the object in my knowledge. This explains the objective basis of a cognition. In this way the equiformity (having the same form) between knowledge and its object should be considered as the most immediate ground determining a particular knowledge as having a particular object. In this sense, *arthasārupya* or objective equiformity should be considered as *Pramāṇa* par excellence. But the objective form of knowledge cannot be kept apart from

19. *Pramāṇa-Vārttika-Bhāṣya*, p. 344-45.

knowledge itself. It is the most intrinsic and essential property of knowledge. It follows hence that the difference between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*, between knowledge and its instrument is not real, but is only an intellectual and analytical construction. The same knowledge when analytically taken in its object form, figures as *pramāṇa* or instrument to itself, and when the same is taken as a total monolithic unit of internal reality manifesting an object, it is called *pramā* or valid knowledge. This is really called the relation between the fixer and the fixed, between the measure and the measured. The object form in knowledge fixes the knowledge as being related to the object. It sizes up the subject-object relation. Hence the relation between *pramāṇa* and *pramā* is not a relation of causal sequence between an antecedent and consequent, but an analytically constructed relation between two aspects of an identical cognitive fact.

Manorathanandin²⁰ sums up the Buddhist position by saying that the form of an object, as appearing in knowledge, is nothing different from knowledge itself. Hence the same knowledge, which is called *pramā* is also its *pramāṇa* - 'dhr̥ eva *pramāṇam*. Thus the Buddhists go to establish the relation of identity between *pramā* and *pramāṇa*.

We shall now consider Dharmakīrti's criteria of knowledge and try to show how the two *pramāṇas*, namely *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* fulfil the criteria.

20. *Pramāṇavārttika-Vṛtti* II, p. 191, pp. 306-7.

Concerning the question as to which criteria of knowledge need to be accepted, there is a fundamental difference between Dharmakīrti and the Nyāya philosophers. According to Dharmakīrti, there are three criteria of knowledge (i) knowledge should be non-inconsistent or non-contradictory (*avisamvādhaka*), (ii) knowledge must have the characteristic of novelty (*avijñātārthaprakāśakatva*), and (iii) knowledge should be serviceable and hence useful (*vyavahartavyatva*)²¹. On the other hand, the Nyāya philosophers are of the view that there are two principal criteria of knowledge, namely *tadvati tad prakāśakatva* and *saphala pravṛtṭijanakatva*. Roughly speaking, the Nyāya philosophers hold the view that correspondence is the test of truth. That is, the nature and features of a thing revealed by the *pramāṇas* are true without contradiction, despite all variations in space, time etc., in so far as they tally with each other. To know an object is to judge it as having such and such properties (*tadvati tad prakāśakatva*). This knowledge of a thing will be true if the thing concerned has those properties. If an object lacks these properties, our knowledge of it, is false. Further, such a knowledge must induce a successful action or practice (*saphala pravṛtṭijanakatva*) on our part, as various actions we undertake in our life are instrumental to our realising legitimate goals of our life through *upādāna* (acquisition of that which is worthy of being acquired) or *hāna* (rejection of that which is unworthy of being acquired).

21. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* I. 3-8; *Nyāyabindu tīkā*, p. 3-5.

may serve his purpose. If it serves his purpose and does not deceive him in that, he makes a retrospect of the whole situation from the first moment of its apprehension till verification as an efficient object. And he then finds a general correspondence between the object series and cognition series changing every moment. This feeling of general correspondence between them gives rise to further activities in him.

Absence of the failure of general correspondence (*a-vi-samvāda*) between object series and cognition series establishes individual correspondence between each moment of the object and its cognition. Had there been no individual correspondence between them at each moment, this fact could have betrayed the percipient sometime, and he could not have taken for granted the general correspondence between them, which is the basis of his daily life. If a cognition points out a jar to us but fails in reaching that to us, we label it false. And it becomes true, when we get a jar. As in our day-to-day behaviour we call that man truthful who makes us reach a reality corresponding to his words, so also we take that cognition to be true which makes us attain an object. Attainment does not mean that the cognition creates an object or forces a cognizer to take it against his will. It can at best turn our attention to a purposive object and turning our attention to a purposive object is nothing but the demonstration of it. Apprehension of an object produces desire in the cognizer which makes him active and as a consequence of it he gets it. Knowledge is not the direct cause of

such attainment but only an antecedent of it Cognition of an object not cognized before will make us active only due to the fact that truth or falsity of a familiar object will at once be evident to us and hence its novelty (*avijñātārthaprakāśakatva*)

Insertion of two negatives in describing knowledge is very significant *Aviśamvāda* means absence of inconsistency and not *samvāda*²⁴, for, it is not possible to see any kind of correspondence between cognition and the fact cognized due to their momentariness So, instead of looking for correspondence between them, we strive to find out the absence of inconsistency or incompatibility in that knowledge. Entities emerging in moments subsequent to the first are neither quite identical with nor entirely different from that of the first moment, but are similar to it and this makes it possible to verify the compatibility or the consistency of a cognition with its object

The positive interpretation of *aviśamvāda* is contrary to the doctrine of *apoha* The import of a word is the negation of the opposite of a thing and not the denotation of something positive according to this doctrine. The word 'cow' stands for that which is 'not-non-cow' and by inference we come to know it to be a 'cow'.

Knowledge of the validity of a cognition is an after thought which shows to be valid in later moments. A cognition is unreliable until it is validated later on by the knowledge of

24. *Dharmottara-pradīpa*, p.17.

absence of inconsistency or incompatibility between cognition and the fact cognised

Avijñātārthaprakāśakatva This second criterion of knowledge emphasizes that our (additional) knowledge must have the characteristic of novelty²⁵. This criterion not only makes growth and development of knowledge possible but also enables avoidance of circularity as well as inflexibility which otherwise are likely to crop up in our knowledge. It emphasizes that in the process of cognition and justification our epistemic enterprise must not close the possibility of hitherto unknown features of things or of our knowledge of them. According to this criterion the object of *pramāṇa* should be something new.

Vyavahartavyatva This is also an important criterion of knowledge. This guarantees the application of our knowledge-claims²⁶. It implies its reliability and acceptability. If our knowledge is not serviceable, it is useless and hence redundant. Such a knowledge would be deceptive and so it would be pointless to have it at all. This criterion is also uniformly applicable to both the kinds of cognitions - perceptual and inferential. When the notion of *vyavahartavyatva* is read in conjunction with *avisamvādakatva* we may also arrive at a

25. *Pramāṇavārttika* I.7-8.

26. *ibid.* I.3-6.

different, though related feature which can be termed as practical or empirical non-contradiction. Without being liable to any change of conceptual confusion, one may hold that in the context of empirical knowledge one of the criteria of truth may be its applicability to certain situations warranted by the cognitive content of what we claim to know. There is a sort of practical oddity or what Nowell-Smith calls logical oddity²⁷ in knowing something to be true and at the same time finding all our attempts to apply it to practical contexts systematically frustrated. Such a situation demands some special explanations which may nevertheless be logically possible to offer in terms of temporary non-obtainability or non-availability of relevant states of affairs that would make the application of certain empirical truths feasible. But in the absence of any such explanation it is absurd to hold an empirical truth which has no relevance to objects, events or processes in the world. What is claimed here is only a diluted or an empiricalised version of the principle of non-contradiction.

The three criteria of applicability of knowledge suggested by Dharmakīrti are supposed to be applicable jointly and not alternatively. But over and above the consideration of their general applicability, knowledge gained through perceptual

27. Nowell-Smith, P.H. (1954) *Ethics*, Penguin Books, esp. Chrs. 6 & 7.

cognition brings in an additional question, namely, that of truth, since it has a bearing on the realm of actuality, *svaśalākṣaṇa*, whereas knowledge gained through inferential cognition has a special bearing on the realm of coherent possibility. Hence, with reference to perceptual cognition Dharmakīrti brings in 'arthakriyāsāmarthyā',²⁸ as a mark of real. By *arthakriyāsāmarthyā* Dharmakīrti means that anything cognized through veridical perception could be taken to be real provided it has a disposition to induce an action on our part which would terminate in our being able to discover it.²⁹ Thus *arthakriyāsāmarthyā* is connecting link between our perceptual knowledge and the reality of an object in the external world of which we have knowledge. If on discovering the object we find that the object in fact is as we had cognized it, then this kind of *tadrūpatva* (correspondence) is decisive of the reality of the object concerned.³⁰ Thus understood *arthakriyā-sāmarthyā* operates as an additional necessary condition in the case of *svaśalākṣaṇātmaka* kind of knowledge, over and above the three criteria already noted, while in case of *sāmānya-lākṣaṇātmaka* kind of knowledge, it will give us its limiting range.

We shall discuss how the two *pramāṇas* accepted by Dharmakīrti fulfil the knowledge criteria. We have already noted

28. *Pramāṇavārttika*, II.3.

29. Prajñākaragupta. *Pramāṇavārttika-Alankāra* II. 1-4 pp. 169-183.

30. *Pramāṇavārttika* II.10-11, 50-54.

that according to Dharmakīrti, *pramāṇa* is non-inconsistent knowledge which reveals an object not known before³¹. This definition of *pramāṇa* by Dharmakīrti may be divided into three sub-headings, namely, (i) *pramāṇa* is knowledge, (ii) *pramāṇa* is non-inconsistent knowledge and (iii) *pramāṇa* reveals a previously unknown real object.

According to Dharmakīrti, *pramāṇa* or a means of knowing should be the most efficient cause of knowledge. He believes that a moment of knowledge is the result of a variety of causes, viz knowledge, the sense organ, an object etc, belonging to the immediately preceding moment. None of them, however is regarded as more efficient than any other. They are, in fact, considered to contribute equally to their common result. Then what is the most efficient cause of knowledge? It is, according to Dharmakīrti, that which differentiates one knowledge from another, e.g knowledge of a cow from that of a horse. In this context a particular object cannot be regarded as *Pramāṇa*, for when it is observed by two persons, say A and B, it becomes an object common to them and we cannot differentiate A's knowledge of it from B's. An object is merely one of the variety of causes contributing

31. *Hetubīndu* I p 2, 18-19 (tatra yad ādyam āśadhāranavisayam darsanam tad eva pramanam) and *Hetubīndutīkā*, p 25, 17-18 (anādhigatavisayatvaṁ arthakriyāśadhanāvisayatvaṁ ca pramāṇa-lakṣanam). *Tarkabhāṣā*, p 1, 5 (pramanam Samyag-jñānam apuryagocaram) etc. Dignāga gave no general definition of *pramāṇa*. Dharmakīrti probably was the first Buddhist logician who discussed the topic.

equally to resultant knowledge. Dharmakīrti proposes that what ultimately differentiates knowledge is the objective image projected into it by the external object. This *pramāṇa* or the means of knowledge is nothing but the resultant knowledge itself or, more precisely, an aspect of this knowledge, i.e., its possession of an objective image (*visayākārātā*) or its resemblance to its object (*arthasārupya*). Therefore, from Dharmakīrti's point of view, any other means of knowledge, such as the sense organ or the contact between the sense organ and the object, should not be regarded as *pramāṇa*.

As a corollary to the first criterion of knowledge, Dharmakīrti adds that *pramāṇa* as non-inconsistent knowledge also implies the fulfilment of human purpose (*arthakriyā*)³². Knowledge is *pramāṇa* if it does not deceive our expectation regarding the object of that knowledge. For example, knowledge of water, if true, should be able to lead us to real water which will satisfy our expectation by quenching our thirst, it should not deceive us like the knowledge of a mirage. According to Dharmakīrti, whether or not knowledge is true, i.e. the truth of knowledge (*pramāṇya*) is ascertained by our experience of, or practical activity towards the object of that knowledge. In short, to be true is to be uncontradicted by our experience and to be able to lead to the satisfaction of our expectation. But a problem arises. If we

32. See Nagatomi, M. (1967-68) 'Arthakriyā', *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vols.31-32, pp. 52-72; and also Mikogami, E. (1979) 'Some Remarks on the concept of Arthakriyā' *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 7, pp. 79-94.

adopt with Dharmakīrti the rigorous theory of momentariness, the object of knowledge should be different from the object of a practical activity induced by that knowledge, and consequently, the truth of the knowledge cannot be ascertained. This is quite true, and perhaps in the strict sense, truth of knowledge cannot be ascertained in any way, for if we deal with the problem in the realm of moments and at the level of sensation, neither an action in general, nor a practical human activity will come under consideration. Nonetheless, it is to be noted that while discussing the nature of *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti refers to 'the fulfilment of a human purpose', 'human activity', and 'experience'.

These concepts presuppose not the world of moments, the particular causal power and sensation, but that of *continua*, the universal causal power and judgement³³. Therefore the object of knowledge under consideration should not be understood in its momentary nature, but should be grasped as a *continuum* of moments or an

33 Dharmakīrti tells about two kinds of causal powers, viz. particular and universal, it is to be emphasized that, at the level of momentary object, there is only one and the same causal power, i.e. the capacity to produce its result in its natural flow. This causal power of momentary object is regarded as particular when we are dealing with sensation and moments, while the same causal power is regarded as a universal causal power to fulfil a human purpose when we are dealing with judgements or *continua*. Thus one and the same momentary object produces both sensation and judgement and, in fact, human activity in general. Sensation grasps the object directly and entirely, judgement indirectly and partially through one of its many universal characteristics. *Nyāyabīndutika* p. 84 (tasmād adhyavasāyam kurvād eva pratyakṣam pramāṇam bhavati ...).

individual It is only when continuity and identity of the object are preserved can we safely say that the truth of knowledge can be ascertained by our later experience despite the temporal difference of the actual objects. Now, all this points to the pragmatic and conventional nature of Dharmakīrti's definition of (true) knowledge.

Dharmakīrti further tries to characterize *pramāṇa* through its object. Namely, the object of *pramāṇa* should be real as well as something new. According to him people resort to *pramāṇa*, when they are looking for the fulfilment of their purpose. Therefore, the object of *pramāṇa* should be a real object which is capable of fulfilling a human purpose. It is a momentary existence in the ultimate analysis, yet the real and momentary object of sensation is grasped as a *continuum* or an individual at the level of judgement and ascertainment of truth, so that it can be the object of a practical activity. In short, a particular real object (*avalakṣaṇa*) is the object of both *pramāṇa* and a practical activity induced by *pramāṇa*³⁴ Furthermore, according to Dharmakīrti, the object of *pramāṇa* should be something new. This idea is probably derived from a sort of commonsense belief that knowledge is insignificant unless it contains some new information. Thus, memory or recognition and perceptual judgement as we shall see in the following pages, are excluded from the realm of *pramāṇa*. A continuous perception, on the other hand, is regarded as *pramāṇa*, though it appears to take in the same object,

34. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* III.53.

since according to the momentariness theory, what appears to be a continuous perception is in fact a series of moments of perceptions which take in new object with each ensuing moment

We have said repeatedly that according to Dharmakīrti, there are only two types of *pramāṇa*, namely, perception and inference. According to him, perception is the initial and direct acquaintance with an object. Supposing that we are in thick darkness, we touch something and have sensation of, say, hardness before we judge it to be a particular hard object and identify it as a stone wall. Such immediate sensation prior to linguistic formulation is what Dharmakīrti refers to as 'perception'. It is characterised by him as 'free from conceptual construction' (*Kalpanāpoḍha*) and 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*). Perception is free from conceptual construction because it is direct and total knowledge of a real object. Dharmakīrti admits of two classes of direct knowledge - erroneous and non-erroneous. He considers that (erroneous) knowledge can occur due to some physical defect; for example, the moon may look double to someone suffering from a certain eye disease³⁵. (Erroneous) direct knowledge should not, of course, be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Non-erroneous direct knowledge alone is considered to be perception as *pramāṇa*.

We shall now see how perception fulfils the criteria of *pramāṇa* discussed so far. Perception is non-inconsistent

35. *Nyāyabindu* I.6 (tayārahitam timirāsubhramananu yanasamkshobhadyanāhitavibhramam jñānam pratyaksam).

knowledge, for it can lead to the satisfaction of our expectation. For instance, perception of water can lead us to proceed to real water, if immediately after the perception, we judge that there is water in front of us. It is to be noted here that since perception is free from conceptual construction, it lacks the nature of decision (*niscaya*) and determination (*adhyavasāya*), the driving causes of our practical activity. Hence perception cannot directly lead to the fulfilment of a human purpose - it does so only indirectly with the help of conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*). If perception is not followed by conceptual knowledge, there will be a sort of continuous perception until the attention is shifted. Perception reveals a previously unknown real object, for its object is supposed to be a unique particular (*svalaksana*) which is both real and new every moment. Thus we can state that perception as defined by Dharmakīrti fulfils his criteria of *pramāṇa*. Perception, it is to be noted here, is thus non-erroneous, non-conceptual, non-verbal, direct and total knowledge of a real particular object (*svalaksana*).

Let us now turn from unconstructed knowledge to conceptual construction or conceptual knowledge. Conceptual construction is verbal, indirect and partial knowledge of an object in its universal characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and it belongs, of course, to the realm of *continua* and judgement. Since conceptual knowledge is also regarded as possessing the nature of decision and determination, it invariably leads us to a practical activity.

Dharmakīrti seems to admit two classes of indirect and conceptual knowledge, namely, inconsistent (*visamvādin*) and non-inconsistent (*a-visamvādin*). Even when we perceive an object correctly, we may form a wrong judgement if there is some obstructing cause or if there is no condition for decision. For instance, we may misjudge a shell as silver on account of the resemblance that the feature of the former has with that of the latter, and we may be under the illusion that things last for a certain period of time because we lack the supernormal power to recognise momentary existence³⁶. Such judgements are contradictory or inconsistent provided they lead us to unexpected results. On the other hand, if there is no obstructing cause and there is a condition for decision, such as repeated experience of a given object, then we will form a non-inconsistent judgement which results in a successful activity. For example, immediately after seeing a beautiful woman, we normally form the judgement that she is a beautiful woman. This kind of judgement may be called a perceptual judgement. This kind of judgement differs in accordance with the inclination of the perceiver : a hungry lion may consider her as a nice dinner, a lustful man may consider her an object of passion, or a yogi may consider her a mere skeleton of blood and flesh.

Unlike perception, perceptual judgement is indirect and partial knowledge of an object, for it grasps a particular object through some of its many universal or shareable characteristics.

36. *Pramāṇa-vārttika* I.44.

That is why it is regarded as erroneous perceptual knowledge. Nonetheless perceptual judgement is non-inconsistent, as mentioned above, because it helps perception lead us to the fulfilment of our purpose. However it is not regarded as *pramāṇa* by Dharmakīrti, for it does not fulfil the second part of his criterion of *Pramāṇa*, viz revealing a previously unknown object. Perceptual judgement gives no new information about its object since the object has already been grasped by the immediately preceding perception.

Perceptual judgement is not the only type of indirect and conceptual knowledge which is non-inconsistent (*a-viśamvādin*). Dharmakīrti admits at least two other types of non-inconsistent indirect knowledge, namely, inference (*anumāna*) or knowledge derived from an inferential mark (*linga*) and verbal knowledge, that derived from a verbal expression. Unlike perceptual judgement he regards inference as *pramāṇa* and considers verbal knowledge as a special kind of *anumāna*.

We shall see how *anumāna* fulfils the *pramāṇa* criteria by Dharmakīrti. A unique particular which is the only reality with causal efficiency, gives rise to perception or sensation if it is in a perceptible condition, only after that perceptual judgement follows if there is no obstructing cause and if there is a condition for decision. However, not every particular is in a perceptible condition and even if it is perceptible, there may be some obstructing cause which, by preventing correct perceptual judgement, gives rise to wrong judgement. Inference (*anumāna*) plays an important role in such a case. A well known example of

inference which is to be found in all the systems of Indian philosophy is as follows : When we see smoke on a faraway mountain, we infer the existence of a fire there. According to Dharmakīrti, an actual fire on the mountain is not perceptible but it can be inferred by the following process (i) a particular fire produces particular smoke, (ii) the mountain together with the smoke gives rise to perception of the smoky mountain, (iii) perceptual judgement of a mountain in general and that of smoke in general follow that perception, (iv) there arises recollection of the invariable relationship (*pratibandha*) between smoke in general and fire in general, and (v) finally conceptual knowledge of fire in general appears with reference to that mountain, viz 'there is a fire on the mountain'.

It is to be noted here that though the immediate object of inference is a universal fire, it is essentially related with the real particular fire on the mountain. Like perceptual judgement inference also is conceptual knowledge and does not grasp a real particular object as it really is. It merely grasps the object through one of its universal characteristics, e.g. fireness. Inference can lead to the satisfaction of our expectation, e.g. after inferring the fire, we can reach the actual fire if we climb up to the top of the mountain. Since inference is conceptual knowledge, it does not lack the nature of decision and determination, hence it leads us to a practical activity. Dharmakīrti gives reasons for how inference being a conceptual knowledge could be *pramāṇa*. His reasoning is as follows :

Inference does not deceive us but leads us to the fulfilment of our purpose (*arthakriyā*) for it is indirectly but invariably derived from the real object. Inferential knowledge of a fire in general is indirectly related to the real fire on the mountain because it is derived by the above mentioned process, and it is invariably related to the real fire because the smoke on the mountain, which is the object of perception initiating the inferential process is actually produced by that fire. Dharmakīrti proposes two types of invariable relationships (to be discussed in detail in the coming chapters) which enable inference, viz. causal relationship (*tadutpatti*, e.g. between a fire and smoke) and essential identity (*tādātmya*, e.g. between the nature of a tree and that of a *simsapa* tree). As a matter of fact, the question how conceptual knowledge, like inference is related to reality constitutes one of the chief philosophical interests of Dharmakīrti. He explains it by the *apoha* theory³⁷, that can be applied to various problems related to conceptual knowledge, such as the object and the function of conceptual knowledge, the nature of a universal and the meaning of a word.

37. See Dravid, R.R. (1972) *The problems of Universal in Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi.

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Theory of *apoha* seeks to establish (i) that concepts have no direct relation to reality; the belief in their objective reference is a transcendental illusion; (ii) that the objects of conceptual cognitions are universal which are pure thought constructions, and (iii) that conceptual knowledge is empirically valid, because it has an indirect causal relation to reality.

though of great importance, a detailed discussion on this theory lies beyond the scope of the present study. In any case, inference can be regarded as *avisaṃvādi* knowledge because it is firmly rooted in reality.

As the above discussion shows, there is little difference between perceptual judgement and inference. But they differ significantly with regard to the problem whether or not they reveal a new fact. To reiterate, perceptual judgement does not give new information; inference, however, can reveal a previously unknown real object, because the actual fire on the mountain is not directly perceived by one who relies on inference. Thus we can state that, unlike perceptual judgement inference as defined by Dharmakīrti does satisfy the criteria of *pramāṇa*. Verbal knowledge is regarded as a special kind of inference by Dharmakīrti. According to him, the hearer of a verbal expression infers what is intended by the speaker who utters it. He seems to presuppose the following process of verbal knowledge. To one who hears the word 'pen', there occurs knowledge in which an idea of pen in general appears on account of his previous experience of verbal expression as well as impression of linguistic convention. Like inference verbal knowledge is non-inconsistent in the sense that it can correctly indicate the intention of the speaker, or more precisely that it can indicate what appears in the conceptual knowledge of the speaker when he utters a word. Since the speaker's intention is not directly accessible to anybody but the speaker himself, it cannot be perceived by the hearer. Hence, it

can be said that verbal knowledge reveals a new fact as long as it indicates the speaker's intention correctly. Thus verbal knowledge too satisfies Dharmakīrti's criteria of *pramāṇa*. There is, however, one important difference between inference proper and verbal knowledge, viz while the former is indirectly but invariably related with reality, the latter has no basis in reality because verbal knowledge is wholly based on linguistic convention.

IV

We have seen in the preceding section that according to Dharmakīrti, there are two main kinds of knowable, viz *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, that they lead to two distinct sorts of cognition, viz *pratyakṣa* (*aparokṣa*) and *anumāna* (*parokṣa*), and that - they are connected with two sorts of truth, viz. *paramārtha-sat* and (*loka*) *saṃvṛtti-sat*. We also discussed the criteria of knowledge stipulated by Dharmakīrti and considered how the two sorts of cognition fulfil those criteria.

It was philosophically necessary on the part of Dharmakīrti to accept coherent possibility of connection between thoughts, experiences and life in accordance with the teaching of the Buddha. This becomes possible only through the coherent possibility of the convergence between *aparokṣa* (direct) and *parokṣa* (indirect) *jñāna* (knowledge). To reduce life, experience or thought into anyone of them is an untenable alternative, while to keep them unconnected is another such

alternative, and Dharmakīrti manages to avoid both these dangers. Accepting that *aparokṣa jñāna* cannot be reduced to *aparokṣa jñāna*, problems characteristic of the former need to be considered separately and in great detail. As pointed out earlier, the domain of *aparokṣa jñāna* is that of sharable, communicable, general, intersubjective or the objective. This domain has its characteristic epistemic problems which need a separate and full scale treatment. Hence, *anumāna* (inferential cognition) or the domain of *aparokṣa jñāna*, merits a full scale discursive treatment of its different aspects. Dharmakīrti discusses various issues concerning *anumāna* in his works such as *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Pramāṇa-ūnīśaya*, *Svātthanumāna-pariccheda*, *Vādanyāya*, *Hetubindu* etc. Although *anumāna* is discussed in these treatises, it is not the same aspect of it or the same problem concerning it that is taken up for treatment in all these works. We do not propose to take up Dharmakīrti's treatment of *anumāna* in its different aspects. Instead, we wish to restrict ourselves to methodological and epistemic considerations of *anumāna* as enunciated by Dharmakīrti in his 'summary' work, *Nyāyabindu*.

It is also interesting to look into the different frameworks of *anumāna* held by Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists, especially Dharmakīrti. For it is generally claimed that they hold the same framework of *anumāna*. It is well known that the Nyāya philosophers advocate the co-extensivity of the domain of ontology, epistemology, and logic/language, i.e. anything that we

now and comprehend must be capable of being disclosed via experience or, to be precise, by perception. Buddhists, on the contrary, believe that whatever we know or cognize need not be anchored in experience. The justification of knowledge need not depend upon its being experienced although experience is essential for the cognition of factual reality/truth. One need not stick to the view that whatever we know must be capable of being given to us in experience. A piece of information which is false, could be entertained as a piece of knowledge. Thus, according to the Buddhists, experience is not a pre-condition of knowledge. Unfortunately, not seeing the point behind the methodological contention of Buddhists, *Naiyāyikas* are bent upon accepting experience as a pre-condition of knowledge. Naturally, their framework could be labelled less flexible. Just as what we know must be experienced is a principle with Nyāya philosophers, so too is communicability a pre-condition of knowledge for them. According to them, whatever we know must be communicable. To subscribe to such a view, according to Buddhists, appears to be submitting ourselves to the dictates of commonsense. Buddhists, especially Dharmakīrti, seem to be correct in refusing to subscribe to such a condition of knowledge, which is not backed by an appropriate philosophical promise. He states that whatever we know or cognize need not necessarily be communicable, as in case of *pratyakṣa*. There is a possibility of what we know to be experienced or communicated, but this need not be a pre-condition

f cognizing something In this regard, middle-path (*madhyama*
pratipada) seems to have been followed by Dharmakīrti by accepting
 mere coherent knowability as a precondition of knowledge or
 cognition.

Chapter - IV

Svārthanumāna and Parārthanumāna

Except Cārvākas, all Indian logicians accept that *anumāna* (inference) is an independent means or source of valid knowledge. But what is *anumāna*? There is a general answer to this question. *Anumāna* literally means knowledge that follows (*anu*) some other knowledge. It is a cognition of an object through the perception of another object that acts as an invariable mark of the former. We may quote here the observation of B.K. Matilal on the general nature of inference. He says "... inference yields knowledge when it is based upon adequate evidence. An evidence is adequate when it not only suggests that something may be the case but also excludes the possibility of case's being otherwise. When an evidence is simply suggestive, we have a guess work. When it goes further on to remove supposition of other possibilities, we have an inference."¹.

Let us be more clear In case we happen to know about two objects or objective characters (say 'M' and 'P') that 'P' is found wherever 'M' is, we can say about a thing 'S' which is seen to possess 'M' (but not 'P') that it possesses 'P' also; this will be a case of inferring the existence of 'P' from the

1. Matilal, B.K. 'Buddhist logic and Epistemology' in Matilal, B.K. and Evans, R.D. (eds) (1986) *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, D. Reidel and Company, p. 4.

existence of 'M' in the thing 'S' In the terminology of Indian logic 'M' will be called 'probans' or 'middle term' (*hetu* or *linga*), 'P' will be called 'probandum' or major term (*sādhya*) and the thing 'S' will be called 'locus of probans' (and of the probandum) or minor term (*pakṣa*), the relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between 'M' and 'P' is called *vyāpti*. This is the general nature of inference which is acceptable to all Indian logicians.²

We are concerned with Dharmakīrti and his theory of inference. According to Dharmakīrti the object of inference is the exclusion of the opposite (*atad-vyāvṛtti*). Inference does not cognise the positive nature of a thing. It is so because perception as we have seen, cognises a thing in its entirety. When a thing is perceived all its attributes are perceived. But it may so happen that owing to some illusion we cannot ascertain correctly what is sensed or perceived and superimpose some outside character on it. It is only to remove these false ascriptions that we take recourse to inference. If it be suggested that inference, too, like perception cognises the positive nature of a thing, there would arise the contingency of no attribute of a thing being left to be cognised by another inference when one inference has already cognised some one

2. 'mīten lingena lingino'rthasya pascānmanam anumanam'.
Nyayabhasya I 1.3.

'tatra svārthamtrirupāllingād yad anumeya jñānam tad
anumanam, *Nyayabindu*, II.3.

particular attribute of this thing. Certainly when the positive nature of a thing has already been ascertained there remains in this thing nothing that is to be ascertained later on. On the other hand, when it is held that inference cognises a thing's exclusion from certain other things (i.e. from things dissimilar to it) it is quite possible that one inference cognises a thing's exclusion from one type of dissimilar things and another its exclusion from another type of dissimilar things (that is to say, on this view one inference does not render another inference futile) It might be urged that ascertainment of a particular attribute belonging to a thing does not presuppose our ascribing an opposite (contrary) attribute to this thing; as for example, when we infer fire from smoke there is no occasion for our ascribing 'absence of fire' to the place in question. Hence it should be held that inference invariably cognises an exclusion. To this Dharmakīrti says that even here when one perceives a place having smoke he is not certain about the nature of this place, and this, in turn, is so because he is under a misapprehension. And again even he who, on account of his non-ascertainment of fire at the place, is under a doubt as to whether this place is fiery or not could not be said to be free from misapprehension. As a matter of fact, only one who falsely ascribes 'absence of fire' to a place or at least is in doubt about the existence of fire at that place takes recourse to inference (in order to prove the existence of fire there). One who is not under a misapprehension or in doubt will not care to

formulate the relations of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence that are necessary for all inference ³

Thus, Dharmakīrti maintains that the proper object to be cognised by inference is a thing's exclusion from the different types of dissimilar things, for, otherwise there would remain nothing to be cognised in a thing after one inference has grasped it in the form of a real unitary partless thing. When it is said that the object of inference is a universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) what is meant by 'universal' is this exclusion of the opposite. This exclusion is not a positive real thing. It is a mental concept. Yet it does not arise in a baseless fashion. It is not merely a creation of pure imagination. It is generated by real things. Moreover, it is the nature of some select real things to generate a particular concept. So, a mental concept is invariably related to those things. It is on this account that though an inference cognises a mental concept, yet it enables us to attain a real thing capable of the intended purposive activity. In so

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3. Vastugrahe'numānāc ca dharmāsaikasya niscaye, Sarvadharmagraho' pohe nayam dosah prasaṅgyate, . . . yada punar anumaneṇa samaropavyavacchedah kriyate, tada naikasamaropavyavacchedad anyavyavacchedah krito bhavati iti tadartham anyat pravarteta, nanu navasyam viparyasapurvaka evapratitaniscayo bhavati; yathā akasmad dhumad agnipratipattih; na hi tatranagnisamaropah sambhavyate; tanna sarvatra vyavacchedah kryate; uktam atradharmipratipattav abhedat sarvapratipattih; bhede va asambaddhasya tatrpratipattir iti; tasmāt tatrapi taddarsinah tatsvabhavaniscayah; kutah? viparyasat; sa ca tam pradeśam tadvyaviktena rupena niscinvann agnisattabhavana vimukhaya buddhya katham aviparyasto nama; tadakarasaropasam-saya rahitas ca tatpratipattau na lingam anusaret; na tasyānvayavyatirekayor adriyeta. *Svarthanumanapariccheda*, p. 17-18.

far as it does not cognise a real thing, it is an illusion. But in so far as it enables us to attain the efficient real thing it is a *pramāna* (valid knowledge)

Dharmakīrti again proves that an inferential judgement is ultimately grounded in a real thing. The real fire that is the cause of the real smoke is the remote cause of the inferential judgement that there is fire on the hill. The real fire generates the real smoke and the real smoke generates its own sensation. This sensation generates the perceptual judgement that there is smoke on the hill. The perceptual judgement in question, together with the help of the memory of the necessary concomitance between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general, generates the inferential judgement that there is fire on the hill. The actual object of inferential judgement is the fire-in-general which is necessarily related with the real unique cases of fire. In other words, the mental concept of fire has the real fires at its basis. And so the inference whose object is the concept of fire necessarily points to the real fire. And on this account an inferential judgement enables us to attain the intended object capable of purposive activity in spite of the fact that its object is a concept and not a real thing. It is only on this ground that inference is considered as *pramāna* by Dharmakīrti.⁴

4. 'yo hi bhāvo yathābhūto sa tadrglingacetasaḥ; hetus tajjā tathābhūte tasmā vastuni lingadhīh, līga-lingidhīyor evaṃ paramāryena vastuni; pratibandhat tadabhasa'sunyayor apy avācānam.' *Pramāṇavarttika*, II 81-82

Dharmakīrti repeats this particular point in different places in different words. He says that the object of knowledge is in fact only one and that is the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). Since such an object is cognised in two different ways, we have recognised two *pramāṇas* (or two types of valid knowledge) - perception and inference. Perception cognises a thing as it is, that is, unique. Inference grasps the same thing as it is not, that is, as general. On this account the former is not an illusion (*abhīrānta*) while the latter may be said to be *bhīrānta*. The question may be raised as to how inference which is *bhīrānta* could be regarded as *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge). *Bhīrānti* (illusion), says Dharmakīrti is not necessarily *apramāṇa*. Only that cognition whose form does not coincide with the form of a real thing is *bhīrānti*. But the minimum requirement of a *pramāṇa* is that it should enable us to attain (through the relevant cognition) an efficient real thing. It is not necessary that all *pramāṇas* should bear the form corresponding to that of a real thing. Hence even *bhīrānti* could be considered to be a *pramāṇa* provided it enables us to attain an efficient thing. And there are cases of *bhīrānti* enabling us to attain an efficient thing. As for example, our cognition of the lustre of a gem as a gem is a case of *bhīrānti* because the gem-form of cognition does not coincide with the lustre form of the lustre actually present there and yet it enables us to attain the gem. But how could this happen? It happens so because the object reflected in this *bhīrānti* (namely, the gem) is invariably related with a real

object (namely, the lustre) Inference is regarded as *bhrānta* by Dharmakīrti because in it the form of knowledge as we have stated earlier, does not coincide with the form of a real thing Yet because the form of an inferential cognition is invariably related with the form of a real thing, it enables us to attain a real efficient thing and hence it is regarded as *pramāna* by Dharmakīrti Though all inferences are *bhrānta*, only those would be regarded as *pramāna* that enables us to attain an efficient thing. The rest of them would be dismissed as false or pseudo inferences.⁵

From the above one gets an impression that Dharmakīrti implicitly accepts the perceptual judgement as a *pramāna*, of course, not an independent *pramāna* but as a case of inference The reason for this is that Dharmakīrti himself says that this perceptual judgement, like the inferential one, removes the superimposition (*āropa*) of a wrong character on a thing Again

5. meyam tva ekam svalakṣaṇam; . . tasya svapararupābhyāṃ gater meyadvyaṃ matam, anyathābhiniवेशेना द्वितीया bhrāntīr isyate; gatis cet pararupena na ca bhrānteh pramānatā; abhiprāyāvisamvādād api bhrānteh pramānatā; gatiḥ apya anyathā drṣtā pakṣasācāyam kṛtottarah; manipradīpa prabhayor manibudhya bhidhāvatoḥ; mithyājñānavisēse' pi viśeso' arthakriyāyāmprati; yathā tadha'yatharthatve'py anumānatadabhyayoh, arthakīrīyanurodhena pramānatvaṃ vyavasthitam.

- *Pramānavārttika* II 53-58.

tatpratibaddhajanmanām vikalpanām atatpratibhāsitve'pi vastunya avisamvād maniprabhayaṃ iva manibhrānteh.

- *Svārthanumanāpariccheda*, p.27.

like inference it enables us to attain an efficient real thing inspite of the fact that its form does not coincide with that of the real thing. But from the Atcāta's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* we gather that the Buddhist logician, in fact, does not consider the perceptual judgement to be a case of inference and that for him the perceptual judgement is not *pramāṇa* while inference is. We shall now explain why the perceptual judgement is not a *pramāṇa* though inference is. We can state three valid grounds to explain this. (1) The thought immediately following in the wake of perception (i.e. perceptual judgement) cognises what is already cognised by perception (*grhītagrahī*) while inference cognises an object hitherto uncognised (*agrhītagrahī*). One might raise an objection here: In inference too thought takes note of a thing as being of the same kind as several earlier cognised things. For example, in inferring fire on the mountain I cognise the same thing which I have earlier cognised at several other places like kitchen etc. To this Dharmakīrti replies that the inference in question makes us cognise not fire as existing in kitchen, etc. (which we have no doubt cognised earlier) but fire as existing now here at this mountain (which we are cognising for the first time). Such however is not the case with thought arising in the wake of perception. For this thought cognises

exactly the same thing as was cognised by the preceding perception ⁶.

The perceptual judgement determines that very unique thing which is already sensed (perceived) by sense-organs; of course, it is a different matter that while determining it, the perceptual judgement distorts it, that is, finds it as something general though it is in fact something unique. And since it does not determine the unique thing hitherto-not-sensed it could not be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Otherwise is the case with inferential judgement. It determines a unique thing that is not already sensed. As for example, it determines the unique fire that is the cause of the unique smoke sensed and judged by a person. But this fire is not already sensed. Thus it could be said that the inferential judgement determines a unique thing hitherto-not-sensed. And on this account inferential judgement could be regarded as a *pramāṇa*. (11) The perceptual judgement does enable us to attain a real thing. But this function of it is merely

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6. yat tu sāmānyam anumānavikalpagrahyam tat kāṇāna vyāpakasambaddhalingāniscayadvara' yatam sambaddhasambandhad anadhigatarthakriyasādhanaṇvisayam arthakriyamupakalpayatiti tadvisayovikalpah pramanam/idam [=pratyaksa prsthabhavi vikalpajnanam] tu naivam, adhigatatvad arthakriyasādhanaṇsyalocanaṇnaneneti.

- Hetubinduṭīkā, p 29

tatra itat syāt-nava anumānavikalpah smrtirup'pi pramāṇam -isyate, tathā hi-yadevanagnivyavrttam vastumatram mahanasādhav anubhutam asit tad eva pradesavisesa dhumadarsanāt smaryate/tadvad vidhivikalpo'pi pramanam bhavisyutiti at aha-'anadhigata'sya' vastu'no rupasya anadhigateriti/evam manyate-yat mahanasādhav anagnivyavrttam prag anubhutam na tat tadde -sādisambandhitayaṇ vanumanavikalpena smaryate kintu yatra pradesa prag ananubhutam tatsambandhitaya. ibid, p.34.

repetition of the function already performed by the preceding perception. On the other hand, in the case of inference, this function is not already performed by some other earlier cognition. So the perceptual judgement could not primarily be said to perform this function, while inference could primarily be said to perform this function. On this account the former is an *apramāṇa* while the latter is a *pramāṇa* ⁷

II

As we have already stated in the last chapter, the entire discussion in epistemology centres around two basic problems what we know? and how do we justify what we know? The first problem deals with nature of objects and means of knowledge whereas the second problem deals with an argument which is formulated to justify the knowledge-claims. In this section we propose to discuss these two basic problems with reference to Dharmakīrti's kinds of *anumāna*. In *Nyāyabindu* as well as in *Pramāṇavārttika* two separate chapters are devoted on two kinds or aspects of *anumāna*, viz. *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna*. For the present, we take up the second problem - how do we justify what we know? This problem deals with an argument. Regarding an

7. *yadi_nāma tadadhyavasāyena_vastuṇy eva puruṣasya pravṛttis tathāpy anadhiḡatasāmanyagrahīno'sya dar'sanat svalaksana eva satyam 'pratyaksena' alocana_jnanakhyena pramāṇyam kim iti nisyate? iti_ced_aha_-'pravṛtttau' svalaksana eva satyam 'pratyaksena alocana_jnanakhyena 'abhinnayogakṣematvat' ibid, p. 36.*

argument there are three principal considerations - (i) what are the conditions of fashioning and formulation of an argument? (ii) what are the conditions of communication of already formulated argument? and (iii) what are the conditions which decide the validity of an argument? Dharmakīrti has taken into considerations all these points while discussing the problems of an argument. Dharmakīrti has discussed validity of an argument by making the discussion between *trirūpa linga (hetu)* and *trairūpya linga (hetu)*⁸. We shall discuss this point in the following chapter. In this section we shall concentrate on the first two considerations.

Formulating an argument and communicating the same are two distinct considerations. When we formulate an argument our concern is restricted only to our being able to fashion and formulate an argument. Here we get concerned with those conditions which are necessary and sufficient for our formulating an argument. When we communicate an argument it is not necessary that we must have entered into a debate or controversy. Independently, of these an argument can be formulated. That is, social context or situation is not a necessary condition for formulation of an argument, although it does not hinder in formulating an argument. When we intend to communicate our already fashioned and formulated argument, we require not only

8. For detail see Bapat, Lata "Dharmakīrti on Trirūpa and Trairūpya Linga", *I.P.Q.* Vol IX, no. 3, 1983.

language through which we can communicate with others but a social context. However, such a social context does not necessarily include the situation of debate or controversy. Further when we communicate an argument, it need not be stated in order to defend our position, nor to criticize the position held by others. Yet entering into a situation of debate or controversy, communication is certainly required. In other words, communication is a necessary condition for our entering into a debate and controversy but the converse does not hold good. Although these two considerations are distinct yet to some extent they are related to each other. When we communicate an argument it is necessary that it must be already fashioned and formulated though the converse does not hold good. But just on this count one should not mix them up. Hence it is necessary to draw a line of demarcation between them. Dharmakīrti seems to be probably the first Indian logician to make the demarcation between them. He has made the distinction between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna* and argued that in *svārthanumāna* an argument is formulated and in *parārthanumāna* it gets communicated.

We shall now attempt to show how Dharmakīrti tackles these issues. We shall discuss on the line of Dharmakīrti in the following manner. First, we shall discuss the nature of *svārthanumāna* or in other words, we shall discuss the conditions which are determinative for the formulation of an argument. Secondly, we shall take up the nature of *parārthanumāna* in order to discuss the conditions which are determinative for the

communication of an argument. Thirdly, we shall consider the question concerning the relation between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna*. Finally, the significance and importance of such distinction will be discussed

In *svārthanumāna*, an argument is formulated. Knowledge of unknown object is inferred or obtained by *svārthanumāna*. It is generally held that there are three important pillars of *svārthanumāna*, viz *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*. *Hetu* is the indicator of *sādhya*. That is why it is also called as *gamaka* of *sādhya*. This *hetu* has the following characteristics *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva*, *asapakṣa-sattva* ⁹ *Sādhya* is that which is going to be inferred. It is indicated by *hetu*. *Pakṣa* is that where *sādhya* is going to be located, e.g. where there is smoke, there is fire. Therefore, there is fire on the mountain. Here smoke is *hetu*, fire is *sādhya* and mountain is *pakṣa*. In this way *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* are the three pillars of *anumāna*. However, these three independently do not help to infer or obtain the unknown object. These three will help to infer the unknown object provided they are related to each other. Hence in addition to these three components of *anumāna*, two other conditions are also required. These two conditions are *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti*. By *pakṣadharmatā* *hetu* is related with *pakṣa*, while by *vyāpti* *hetu* is related with *sādhya*.

9. *trairūpyam punarlingasyānumeye sattvam eva, sapakṣa eva sattvam, asapakṣe ca sattvam eva niścitaṁ.*

- *Nyāyabindu*, II, p. 102.

When we consider the treatment of *vyāpti* at the hands of Dharmakīrti we deal with two issues (i) how does *vyāpti* relate *hetu* with *sādhya*? and (ii) what is *vyāpti*? *Vyāpti* relates *hetu* with *sādhya*. *Hetu* is a *linga* or indicator of *sādhya* which is *lingin* (indicated). Now something could indicate something else quite accidentally. Further, the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* may be operative from outside alone but not conversely. Under such circumstance the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* would remain merely to be accidental and arbitrary. In order to avoid this kind of situation Dharmakīrti holds that there must be a tie or relation (*pratibandha*) between *hetu* and *sādhya*. Such *hetu* is *pratibaddha* while *sādhya* is *pratibandhaka*.¹⁰ Further the relation under consideration between *hetu* and *sādhya* should be such that the former of them is *vyāpaka*. It is this that makes either the *anvaya* or *vyatireka* kind of monodirectional relation between them available.¹¹ This kind of accessibility of *sādhya* through *hetu* via *anvaya* or *vyatireka* is made available respectively through *sādharmya* or *avaiśādharmya*, although in both the cases there is some kind of indicator-indicated relationship. This dual mode of expressing the relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya* is indicative of two kinds of things. In fact *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are so related with each other that mutually they are respectively

10. *sa ca pratibandhah sadhërthe lingasya* - *ibid*, p. 102

11. *etena anvayavyatirekai, yathā svapramānena niścitam. Svārthanumanapariccheda* p. 20.

excluded by each other and in consequence should be considered to be interdefinable,¹² especially in so far as *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are captured through *bhāva* and *abhāva* respectively. Now, since anything cannot simultaneously be captured through both *anvaya* as well as *vyatirekin* ways, accordingly *anvaya-vyatirekin* as a combined mode of comprehending anything in both *anvaya* as well as *vyatirekin* ways is both redundant and meaningless.¹³

The relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* under consideration should be *nāntarīyaka*¹⁴ which is explained by Dharmakīrti saying that the relation between them should be incapable of being done away with, altered or modified. Dharmakīrti further holds that *vyāpti* cannot be contingent and accidental. According to him, *vyāpti* is not a *samānādhikarāṇya* kind of relation between *sādhya* and *hetu* which is anchored in our comprehending things in a certain way or our using expressions in a certain sense. In addition, *vyāpti* as a *niyam*¹⁵ exhibits two more characteristics. First, it is an exceptionless context-free universal rule,¹⁶ such

12. *anvaya-vyatirekiyōr anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvād itī/ ... bhāvābhāvau ca parasparavyavacchedarūpau* - *Nyāyabīndutīkā* III. p. 321.

13. *asiddhāyāmasattāyām sandigdha vyatirekītā/anvayo vyatireko va sattvam va sadhyadharminī.* - *Pramāṇavarttika*, II. p. 349.

14. *nāntarīyakatā sādhye sambandhah seh nekṣyate.* - *ibid* III, p. 385.

15. *kāryakāranābhāvad vā svabhāvad vā niyāmakāt/avinābhāvanīyamo' darsananna na darśanat//* - *ibid*. II, p. 269.

16. *ibid*

that it points to a *hetu* which is unfailingly associated with *sādhya* through non-obtainability of *hetu* at *vipaksa* and not through obtainability at *sapaksa* ¹⁷ Secondly, *vyāpti* as a *niyam* is a necessary rule through which *sādhya* is context-freely associated with *hetu* in the absence of which there just cannot be any unfailing association with them ¹⁸ By *paksadharmatā*, *paksa* is related to *hetu*. In this way, there are three important components for formulation of an argument, namely, *paksa*, *sādhya*, and *hetu*. In addition to these three components, there are *vyāpti* and *paksadharmatā* which conjoin all the components together and help to formulate an argument. In this way, in *svārthanumāna*, an argument is formulated.

Knowledge which is acquired and is formulated in *svārthanumāna*, is communicated in *parārthanumāna*. The aim of *parārthanumāna* is to communicate the knowledge which is acquired through *trairūpya* (three featured) *līnga* ¹⁹ There are two ways through which an argument is communicated, viz. (i) by communicating similarity (*sādharmya*), or (ii) by communicating dissimilarity

17 *vipakse hetoradarsanāt na sapakse darsanāt.*

- *Pramānavārttikavṛtti* II, p. 269.

18. *avasyambhāvanīyamah kaḥ parasyānyathā paraiḥ.*

- *Pramānavārttika* II, p. 269.

19 *trirūpalingā khyānaṁ parārthanumānāt.*

- *Nyāyabīndu* III, p. 186.

vaidharmya) ²⁰. By *sādharmya* what is intended is similarity of *ādhyadharmin* with *dr̥ṣṭāntadharmin*. E.g. where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake, therefore there is no smoke on the river. An argument is communicated by either of these ways, i.e. by communicating either similarity or dissimilarity. Since an argument is communicated in *parārthanumāna*, *parārthanumāna* may be said to be of two kinds expressively. Accordingly, *parārthanumāna* is classified as *sādharmyavat parārthanumāna* where similarity between *sādharmyadharmin* and *dr̥ṣṭāntadharmin* is the basis of communication. Although these are different modes of communication, yet the object of both of them is the same that is to communicate *trairūpya* *linga*, since the difference between them is merely expressive or communicative. ²¹. For what is communicated by *sādharmya* may lead to a cognition of a thing through *vaidharmya* such as if *sādhyā* is not there then there can not be *anvaya* of *hetu* with it. Likewise, communication of an argument via *vaidharmya* may lead to a cognition of a thing through *sādharmya* such as if *sādhyābhāva* does obtain, then *hetvābhāva* too can not fail to obtain. Moreover, except in the case of those things which are naturally tied with each other through *īdātmya* (identity) or *īdūtṭpatti* (causation), we cannot infer invariable (*nīyamena*) absence of one thing from that of

20. *sādharmyavad vaidharmyavac ceti* - *ibid* III, p. 192

21. *nānayoraitthatah kascid bhedah/anyatra prayogabhedāt.*

- *ibid* III, p. 192.

classification of *parāṭhānumāna* into *sādharmyavat* and *vaidharmyavat* is according to the method through which we communicate. It is on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity between *sādhya* and *dr̥ṣṭāntadharmiṇ* that we are going to communicate. This classification of *anumāna* is on the basis of expressive form and not on the basis of differential *avinābhāva* *niyam* involved. In fact *avinābhāva* is a *niyam* which determines the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* and *niyam* cannot be classified as it is the determiner in any case in the same way.

Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, seems to be classifying *anumāna* as *anvaya*, *vyatireka* and *anvaya-vyatireka* on the basis of *vyāpti*. For according to them, *vyāpti* is a relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* which can be classified as *anvaya-vyāpti*, *vyatireka-vyāpti* and *anvaya-vyatireka-vyāpti*.

Communication of an argument is possible only when at least two individuals or persons are present, i.e. a person who communicates and a person whom something is communicated. In other words, social condition is a necessary condition for communication. Without social context an argument cannot and need not be communicated although without it an argument can be formulated. Further, Dharmakīrti accepts that there are two components of *parāṭhānumāna* viz. *vyāpti* and *paksadharmatā*²³. It

23. dvayorapyanyoh prayogayornāvaśyam pakṣanirdeśah.

- ibid. III, p. 231.

is so, because, according to Dharmakīrti, it is not necessary that an argument is communicated only when an individual enters into debate and controversy. For, without participating in debate and controversy, an individual can communicate an argument. In this situation, the problems of how to defend one's own position and how to criticize the position held by others do not arise. While according to Naiyāyikas, when we communicate an argument, we necessarily enter into debate and controversy. Hence, according to them, when we communicate an argument, it is necessary to defend one's own position and criticize the position held by others. That is why it becomes necessary for them to hold five components of *parāṛthānumāna* viz *pratijñā*, *hēta*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *niṣṣaṇa*.

The nature and role of *svāṛthānumāna* and *parāṛthānumāna* are not so distinct from each other, rather they are related to each other. Articulation and communication of an argument necessarily presuppose an argument being already formulated but the converse does not hold good. Dharmakīrti understands the importance of making the distinction between them. Hence, he classifies the *anumāna* into two. In the *svāṛthānumāna*, a *parokṣa* object is cognised on the basis of *trairūpya* *linga*. In *parāṛthānumāna*, one explains or communicates what one has cognised oneself. Dharmottara explains Dharmakīrti's point as follows. *Svāṛthānumāna* is that through which one comes to comprehend an unknown object for oneself, whereas *parāṛthānumāna* is that which someone else comes to be informed. Further elaborating this, it is brought out that one's coming to know something oneself is the

objective of *svārthanumāna*. That *anumāna* by which one comes to know a *parokṣa* object oneself is known as *svārthanumāna*. *Parārthanumāna*, on the contrary, is that *anumāna* through which the statement or knowledge which is acquired through *svārthanumāna* is communicated or informed to others. However, according to Dharmakīrti, the main crux of the distinction between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna* is that it is neither sought to be made on the basis of the respective purposes they serve, nor on the basis that while one of them is *trirūpa-līṅga*, other is not. This basis of the distinction between them is erroneous.

The basis of the distinction has to be sought elsewhere. In *svārthanumāna*, the person who infers, knows the inferred object himself and formulates an argument, while in *parārthanumāna* he communicates the knowledge of the inferred object to others. Hence it could be said that *svārthanumāna* can be independent of social context. Dharmottara also interprets this classification of *anumāna* by saying that there are two distinct characteristics of these kinds of *anumāna* as each of these kinds has a unique and distinctive role to play. *Svārthanumāna* is *ñānātmaka*, while *parārthanumāna* is *śabdātmaka* ²⁴. *Svārthanumāna* is *ñānātmaka* because in it some *parokṣa* object is cognised. *Parārthanumāna* is *śabdātmaka*, because the information which is available to us through *svārthanumāna* is articulated and communicated. Thus

24. *parārthanumānamśabdātmakam, svārthanumānam tu ñānātmakam.*

- *Nyayabinduṭīkā*, II, p. 97.

parāarthānumāna is both *ñānātmaka* and *śabdātmaka*, because it involves two aspects, cognition of a *parokṣa* object and articulation and communication of that cognition, while *svāarthānumāna* involves merely the knowledge aspect. That is why the distinguishing marks of *svāarthānumāna* and *parāarthānumāna* are knowledge on the part of inferring person and communication of it respectively. But whether *anumāna* figures as instrument of cognition or that of communication, it involves the same kind of components and determiners of validity or soundness remain exactly the same. Further, since no knowledge could be communicated unless one has it already and since the instrument of cognition of *parokṣa* object and communication of it is the same, it is small wonder that *parāarthānumāna* formally involves *svāarthānumāna* and since the latter is a fullfledged *anumāna*, it is not a matter of surprise that it is determined by *trairūpya* *linga* and it is *tridhā* as well, its *tridhātva* being determined by *tridhātva* or *tripakāraakatva* of *hetu*. It, therefore, makes no sense either to say that *parāarthānumāna* alone is *anumāna* in the true sense of the term or even that the basis of making distinction between them is the differential purpose they serve. Thus in *svāarthānumāna*, a *parokṣa* object is inferred on the basis that *trairūpya* *linga* or an argument is formulated in such a way that the *parokṣa* object is inferred through it. In *parāarthānumāna* such an argument is communicated. Argument is not communicated unless it is formulated though the converse does not hold true. Hence formation of an argument is necessary condition for its

initial or later communication That is how *svārthanumāna* is presupposed by *parārthanumāna*

Such a kind of distinction was neither made nor acknowledged by other Indian logicians. Bhāsarvajña seems to accept the distinction but the ground of making the distinction that he stipulates is unsatisfactory. According to him, an *anumāna* is *svārtha* provided it is not employed to counsel or persuade somebody, while the one that is employed for such a purpose is *parārtha* and is composed of five components those which are traditionally acknowledged in the Nyāya tradition right from Gautam. In this context, it is important to understand that the classification of *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *parārtha* originates from the Buddhist tradition, and it came to be observed and incorporated into Nyāya tradition quite late, first attempt of this kind being made by Bhāsarvajña. Upto Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, the Nyāya tradition seems to be totally silent about it. But even after it came to be incorporated in the Nyāya tradition and even though this classification continues to be there in the Navya-Nyāya tradition as well, the basis of making the classification is lost sight of and as a result the classification remains merely to be decorative without serving any purpose. The only difference between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna* in the Nyāya tradition is that in the case of *parārthanumāna* alone *pañcāvayava* is required and it is required only when we want to counsel and advise others. This so happens because at the hands of Naiyāyikas the issues of formulation of

an argument and its communication are mixed up. Further, communicative context is also considered to be determinative of the formulation of an argument as well. Hence, for them, conditions determinative of formulation of an argument and its communication are one and the same.

Dharmakīrti's distinction between *svārthanumāna* *parārthanumāna* is significant in more than one sense. First, it bears upon the distinction between fashioning and formulation of an argument on the one hand and that of its communication on the other. Secondly, while it tells us that even a non-social context is enough for our coming to fashion and formulate an argument, a social context is essential for its being communicated. Thirdly, since an argument that comes to be communicated is already fashioned and formulated, unless an argument already fulfils those conditions which need to be fulfilled, i.e. unless it may stand as an argument, the question of its communication just does not arise. Fourthly, since fashioning and formulation of an argument is prior to its communication and since the conditions of formulation assure and guarantee its being able to be considered an argument, its mere communicability could neither be considered to be prior to its being fashioned and formulated nor could it be said to guarantee its argumentativity. This is especially the case, since plain and simple narration is communicative enough although it does not become argumentative just on that count. That is why, Dharmakīrti begins considering *svārthanumāna* first, while consideration of *parārthanumāna* is

taken up later. Fifthly, the distinction between *svārtha* and *parārtha* cannot be understood as that between an argument for oneself and that for others, as it is normally, though erroneously, done. In fact, there is nothing like argument for oneself and that for others. Even when arguments are employed either for self persuasion or in order to persuade others, arguments that come to be employed need not differ from one another. Finally, it may be noted that Dharmakīrti seems to be the first logician who has discussed these problems in the context of *anumāna*.

III

In the analysis of *anumāna*, we observed that *parārthanumāna* is not a different kind of *anumāna* at all in the strict sense of the term, since it is nothing else but a linguistic-expression of what is already cognised inferentially (in *svārthanumāna*). Any piece of information that gives rise to indirect cognition (*parokṣa jñāna*) is not and cannot be called an inferential cognition simply because it has certain form and content of its own. Indirect cognition must be capable of being presented in an argumentative form. Otherwise, any sort of narration or description would enjoy the status of inferential cognition, just because it makes us cognise indirectly and has a certain form and content. Hence, any form and content giving rise to indirect cognition is not to be reckoned as an inferential cognition. In

this section, we propose to discuss the necessary and/or sufficient structural conditions which need to be satisfied in order that an indirect cognition is counted as an inferential cognition. Dharmakīrti argues that *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* are necessary and sufficient for entertaining an indirect knowledge-claim. Structurally speaking, these are the three constituents of *anumāna*, according to Dharmakīrti²⁵ With these three constituents one can always fashion and formulate an argument and entertain an inferential knowledge-claim. Granted that these three conditions are sufficient to fashion, formulate or entertain an inferential knowledge-claim, are they merely the necessary structural conditions of *anumāna* and not the sufficient ones? If it is not so, what are the additional sufficient conditions? Such questions need to be considered with care. The structure or constitution of *anumāna* according to Dharmakīrti, is not merely a heap or pile of its structural conditions, namely, *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*. Nor are these constituents designated to be interconnected with one another in whatever fashion one may deem it fit to do so. Their organisation and inter-relationship has very close connection principally with two fundamental aspects of *anumāna*.

Firstly, there are two conditions viz. *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti* which regulate an inferential knowledge-claim. In other words, *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* need to be connected with one

25. *Svārthanumānapariccheda*, pp. 1-5.

another with the help of these two conditions. Of the two regulative conditions viz *vyāpti* and *paksadharmatā* the former establishes connection between *hetu* and *sādhya*, the latter establishes it between *pakṣa* and *hetu*. A detailed discussion on these two regulative conditions of *anumāna*, however, will be undertaken in the following chapter.

Further, it should be noted here that merely because argument is fashioned and formulated, it does not automatically guarantee that it should be valid and sound. Likewise, just because one has come to entertain an indirect knowledge-claim, this in itself does not warrant that it is tenable. Some conditions of *anumāna* like *hetu* have an important bearing upon validity and soundness of an argument via its peculiar characteristics like *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *asapakṣa-asattva*. We shall also discuss these three characteristics of *hetu* in the following chapter.

Having briefly mentioned the above points, we may now proceed to analyse the nature of the three structural conditions viz. *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* and argue as to why each of them needs to be considered to be so.

Pakṣa: Dharmakīrti explains the nature of *pakṣa* as 'Anumeyah dharmī, sādhya (viśiṣṭa) dharmatvāt'.²⁶ *Pakṣa* is also called

26. *Nyāyabindu*, p. 24; *Dharmottarapradīpa*, p. 24-26, 90-97.

anumeya.²⁷ *Pakṣa* is (called) a *dharmī* due to its being characterised (*dharmatvāt*) by a *sādhya* (as capable of being) particularized (*viśiṣṭa*). Thus understood *pakṣa* is a reference point such that if a *hetu* related to *sādhya* is related to it (*pakṣa*), then, on that basis, *sādhya* could be related to it (*pakṣa*). That *pakṣa* is sought to be understood as a reference point in Dharmakīrti's treatment of *anumāna* could be further reinforced with the help of the following point. The object of inferential cognition is always *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* which although perfectly conceivable coherently, is not necessarily instantiated though it is instantiable in principle. But just because an instantiable *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is not as a matter of fact instantiated, this in itself does not forbid it to become object of inferential cognition.

Pakṣa also determines the range within which the *sādhya* could be discovered provided it is discoverable, or at least considered as coherently conceivable. Mangala R. Chinchore in her recent book has given a very good metaphor to explain the point

"*Pakṣa* is like a pond or lake in which fishes of *sādhya* could be angled with the help of the angle of *hetu*".²⁸

27. *Svārthanumāna-pariccheda*, pp. 1-5, 70-73.

28. Chinchore, Mangala R. (1989) *Dharmakīrti's Theory of Hetu-centricity of Anumāna*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, p.74.

Dharmakīrti also describes *pakṣa* to be *jijñāsītaviśeṣodharmī* (subject-qualified by the property to be proved in it).²⁹

Sādhya : *Sādhya* is that which is inferred. It is related to *hetu* on the one hand through *vyāpti* and could be or possibly is connected to *pakṣa* as a *dharma* of it on the other. *Hetu* is the indicator of *sādhya* and *sādhya* is that which is indicated by it. Since *sādhya* is to be inferred, its nature cannot be determined prior to its being inferred. Since it happens to be cognised through an indirect knowledge that we wish to have, we can at the most say that such an inferred *sādhya* is connected with *hetu* consistently. The reason why *sādhya* needs to be considered as a structural condition of *anumāna* is that if it were not so, the process of inferring would lack an appropriate terminus and it would remain a matter of endlessly connecting one thing with another. In the absence of *sādhya* resorting to *anumāna* would be a redundant and futile exercise. Thus understood, in its absence the very possibility of the framework of *anumāna* would be annihilated and everything would be a matter of direct cognition. Hence it is necessary to acknowledge *sādhya* to be a necessary component of *anumāna*.

Hetu : An indirect knowledge is made possible only through *hetu*. Without *hetu* one cannot have cognition of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. And thus understood inferentially, *hetu* is a pre-condition of

29. *Nyāyabindu*, p. 24, 60.

indirect cognition, and since, according to Dharmakīrti, indirect cognition becomes possible only through *anumāna*, *hetu* is its precondition as well. *Hetu* is a characteristic feature (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*) of *pakṣa*³⁰ and hence related to *pakṣa* through *pakṣa-dharmatā*. It is also related to *sādhya* through *vyāpti*. Thus *Hetu* is related to both *pakṣa* and *sādhya*. Obviously, it plays an important role in the format of *anumāna*. Inference is a mode of inferring *sādhya* on the basis of *hetu*. Hence it is also called *sādhana* or *linga*. *Hetu* is the indicator of *sādhya*, but from whatever *hetu* that is available, the legitimate and requisite *sādhya* cannot be inferred. *Hetu* remains a proper indicator of the legitimate *sādhya*, provided there is a certain relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. If *hetu* obtains, *sādhya* fails to obtain then *hetu* must also fail to obtain. Precisely because of this when one deals with *anumāna* one deals primarily with *hetu*. We have to start with *hetu* in order to formulate an argument. As we have already mentioned in the beginning of this section, even the consideration of the tenability or otherwise of an argument also depends on *hetu*. We shall be discussing this aspect in the following chapter. Hence, among the structural conditions of *anumāna* *hetu* gets precedence and priority over others.

We have so far noted in this section the structural conditions which Dharmakīrti has laid down. We also argued that these conditions are minimally necessary for both cognition as

well as the justification of indirect knowledge claim that we have in an inferential knowledge. Now we shall point out the peculiarity of Dharmakīrti in formulating the structural framework of *anumāna*. We shall try to see the peculiarity or uniqueness of Dharmakīrti by paying attention to his responses to some of the contentions put forth by his Nyāya-predecessors

Nyāya-logicians accept five (structural) constituents (*pañcāvayava*) of *anumāna* ³¹. These five are the necessary and sufficient constitutive conditions of formulating an argument (*anumāna*) according to the Nyāya. We shall discuss each of them one by one

Pratijñā It is supposed to enunciate the point sought to be established (*sādhya*) through *anumāna*. Dharmakīrti does not accept this as a necessary and sufficient constituent of *anumāna* on many grounds. First, enunciation of *sādhya* cannot be held to be constitutive of *anumāna*. Secondly, *pratijñā* cannot be a structural condition of *anumāna*, for without it, it is perfectly legitimate to have inferential cognition. Thirdly, *pratijñā* is also not essential for communication of *anumāna*.

Hetu : *Prima-facie* it appears as though both Naiyāyikas and Dharmakīrti agree on acceptance of *hetu* as an *avayava* of *anumāna*. But if we closely see, we shall find that its role and nature in their respective theories of *anumāna* are different. For

31. Nyāya-sūtras I. i.32.

Naiyāyikas accept *hetu* as a representative of *anumāna* whereas Dharmakīrti accepts *hetu* as the centrally important structural condition of *anumāna*. And secondly, in Nyāya *hetu* plays different roles in cognition and communication whereas in Dharmakīrti's theory it plays the same role in both cognition as well as the communication of an argument.

✓ Udāharana This is the third constituent of *anumāna* accepted by Nyāya. It is an illustrative example and its acceptance is held to be essential on two grounds. First, it is a representative of *Pratyakṣa* as a *pramāṇa* and secondly, perceptibility is accepted as a pre-condition of *anumāna*. Dharmakīrti rejects this as a constitutive condition of *anumāna* on two grounds. First, for the possibility of inferential cognition or communication, mere coherent possibility or conceivability is enough. Hence, no need to insist on actual experience. And secondly, it is too stringent to hold that perceptibility is a pre-condition of *anumāna*. Although inferential cognition need not be ruled out by convergence on facts, to insist upon it as a precondition of it is unwarranted.

Upanaya · *Upanaya* is reaffirmation of the subject to be proved on the basis of *udāharana*. Also, *upanaya* is a representative of the *upamāna pramāṇa* accepted by Nyāya. Dharmakīrti rejects this as a constitutive condition of *anumāna* for, according to him, *upanaya* has no role to play in *anumāna* - cognitively or communicatively.

Further, *upamāna* as an independent *pramāna* is rejected by him, subsuming it under *anumāna*.

✓ *Nigamana* · *Nigamana* (final conclusion) is a re-statement of *pratiñā* (enunciation), on the basis of the statement of *hetu*. Dharmakīrti rejects *nigamana* as a constitutive condition of *anumāna*, for according to him, what one has (already) proved need not be re-stated. Further, this is neither cognitively nor communicatively necessary

From the above, one can see that according to Nyāya, *anumāna* is an *avayavī* (an organic whole) and five constituents (*pañcāvayavas*) are its parts. And though the whole is constructed out of its parts, it is not just a bundle of them, it has its own status apart from them. That is why each *avayava* is presented as a sentence or a proposition. Further for the Naiyāyikas communicability is the primary characteristic of *anumāna* and cognition is determined by it. Consequently, the structure and format of *anumāna* get, in their thought, automatically moulded. But in the case of Dharmakīrti, cognition being primary, *avayavas* need not be expressed in a sentential or a propositional form. The structural conditions of *anumāna*, that Dharmakīrti speaks of, viz *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* appear more like terms in sentences rather than sentences themselves

CHAPTER - V

Vyāpti, Pakṣadharmatā and Hetu

With the help of *anumāna*, we can have *parokṣa jñāna*. Since it is impossible without *hetu* it is obviously *hetu* which determines it. However, such a knowledge becomes possible not through random or mechanical connection of *hetu* and *sādhya*, but rather only through a particular relation between them - the relation regulated by the rule of *vyāpti*. If this does not hold, knowledge by description gained without *anumāna* would also have to be counted as species of *parokṣa jñāna*. Likewise, the relation between *pakṣa* and *hetu* cannot be of any random kind, it needs to be regulated by a characteristic feature called *pakṣadharmatā*, which is another regulative condition of *anumāna*. Both these kinds of conditions - viz *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are required to be fulfilled simultaneously. Hence, while the pillars of *anumāna*, viz *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*, as we have seen in the last chapter, bring out principal supports on which it stands, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* exercise and exhibit their control over them in such a way that they turn out to be the very foundations of *anumāna*, it is within their jurisdiction alone that the intended *sādhya* can be inferred. However this does not mean that *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are determinative of every feature of *anumāna*. But they are the conditions of the very possibility of *anumāna* and consideration of validity of *anumāna* is consequent upon the formulation of *anumāna*.

Generally speaking, *vyāpti* should be acceptable to everybody who accepts inferential cognition. The question is how to interpret it? And secondly, like *vyāpti*, *paksadharmatā* also has an important role to play as a regulative condition of *anumāna*. Prior to Dharmakīrti, in the Nyāya tradition and also perhaps in the Buddhist tradition, nobody, it seems, had thought of *paksadharmatā*, much less articulate and explicate it. Before these two concepts viz. *vyāpti* and *paksadharmatā*, according to Dharmakīrti, are discussed, it is important to note that neither of the two conditions on its own is either necessary or sufficient as regulative conditions of *anumāna*.

In the last section of the preceding chapter it has been pointed out that *pakṣa* is called *dharma* (of which it is a feature) because and in so far as, *sādhya* as *dharma* (feature) is predicable of it. Now while discussing *paksadharmatā* condition, we will point out that *paksadharmatā* guarantees certain relation between *pakṣa* and *hetu* as it is an *asādhārana* (uncommon) *dharma* of *pakṣa*. *pakṣa* is *dharma*, not only with reference to *sādhya* alone but also with reference to *hetu*, and the relation between these two *dharma*s viz. *sādhya* and *hetu* is governed by *vyāpti*.

Paksadharmatā ensures a relation of *hetu* to *pakṣa* such that *hetu* is *asādhārana dharma* of it. In order that the relation between *hetu* and *pakṣa* does not lapse into that between *hetu* and *sādhya*, *hetu* needs to be such as *asādhārana dharma* of *pakṣa* that it could be regulated by *paksadharmatā* only. Mangala

R. Chinchore¹ while discussing the *hetu-centric* feature of *anumāna* has very rightly illustrated *paksadharmatā* condition while giving an analogy of a daughter's relation with her mother. If *paksadharmatā* is sought to be understood from the side of the *paksa* to that of *hetu*, then we would miss *asādhāraṇa* feature of it, for more than one *dharma* could be predicable of it. For example, a mother's relation to her children. Indirect cognition which *anumāna* makes available to us is that of *sādhya* and it can not be had if we just have cognition of the relationship between *hetu* and *paksa* or for that matter, of a relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* unmediated by *vyāpti*. The *hetu* which is connected with *paksa* through *paksadharmatā* is required to be shown to be related to *sādhya* through *vyāpti*. It is not merely *hetu-paksa* relation that is required to be regulated, *hetu-sādhya* relation too is necessary to be regulated, because any sort of relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not conducive to the emergence of cognition through *anumāna*. Thus both *paksadharmatā* and *vyāpti* function and operate as conditions giving rise to *parokṣa jñāna* through *anumāna*. They are the conditions of the very possibility of *anumāna*, such that if any one of them is absent *anumāna* would just be impossible. Brendan S. Gillon also observes these 'two conditions necessary in the very foundation of Dharmakīrti's theory of *anumāna*. While defining and classifying inference

1. Chinchore, Mangala R. *Dharmakīrti's Hetu centrality of Anumāna*, op. cit. p. 95.

according to Dharmakīrti, he feels it necessary to note the ^efor most point which Dharmakīrti says about the very form of inference - schema. He quotes :

"*Pakṣa-dharmah tat-anvaya vyāptih hetuḥ*, i.e. the *hetu* is a superstratum (*dharma*) of the *pakṣa* and it (i.e. the *hetu*) is pervaded by a feature [i.e. another superstratum (*dharma*), that is, the *sādhya*] which is in it (i.e., the *pakṣa*)" ²

We now turn to the nature and function of *vyāpti*. But before we discuss the nature and role of *vyāpti* in *anumāna*, let us note that Dharmakīrti was not interested in considering the nature of *vyāpti* in so far as it is applicable only to our arguments relating to things in this world. His primary interest is to spell out the nature and significance of *vyāpti* as a condition of *anumāna* in such a way that it is understood as the condition of the very possibility of *anumāna*. Dharmakīrti is not interested in giving a descriptive account of the way we reason when we think about anything at all. Nor is he interested in giving account of the psychological factors involved in the process of reasoning and the role they play in it. His concern with *anumāna* may be said to be that of offering its critique - spelling out the conditions of the very possibility of *anumāna* in such a way that if and when they are fulfilled *anumāna* being fashioned and formulated would

2. Gillon, Brendan S. 'Dharmakīrti and his theory of Inference' in Matilal, B.K. and Evans R.D. (eds) (1986) *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, pp. 79-80

remain a permanent possibility. When he criticises his adversaries on various points related to the conditions of *anumāna* in discussion, his criticisms are directed at pointing out that their concern with *anumāna* does not and cannot in fact amount to be its critique. From Dharmakīrti's point of view, the crucial point is to spell out the conditions of its possibility and consideration of various problems concerning it in the light of the fulfilment of the conditions of its possibility.

Mangala R. Chinchore (1987) has pointed out that the concept of *vyāpti* bears a special status and significance in Buddhist logic. She says

"In Nyāya tradition *vyāpti* is always understood as a relation (*sambandha*) while in the Buddhist tradition it is sought to be understood as a rule (*niyama*) . . . the rule called *vyāpti*, on Buddhist view, is unexceptionable or never failing and hence holding necessarily (*avinābhāva*)"³

Vyāpti governs the relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya*. *hetu* is *linga* (indicator or sign) of *sādhya* which is *lingī* (the indicated or signified). It is generally accepted though that *vyāpti* regulates the relation between *sādhya* and *hetu*, there is divergence of opinion regarding the very nature of *vyāpti* among the schools of Indian Philosophy. While the Nyāya philosophers

3. Chinchore, Mangala R. (1987) 'Some Thoughts on Significant Contributions of Buddhist Logicians', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 15, p. 169.

understand *vyāpti* as a relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*, Dharmakīrti treats it as a rule (*niyama*) regarding the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*. The above two claims are quite opposed to one another because relation itself is not a rule, nor is rule itself a relation, although there can be a rule governing relation whether the relation under consideration is between separable relata or between distinguishable relata. When it is said by Dharmakīrti that *vyāpti* as a *niyama* regulates a relation, from this one should not conclude that it does regulate any and every kind of relation. On the contrary, it regulates only pervader-pervaded (*vyāpya - vyāpaka*) kind of relation⁴. From this it also does not follow in any sense that *vyāpti* is generative of *vyāpya - vyāpaka* relation. It only says that given *vyāpya - vyāpaka* kind of relation, *vyāpti* regulates it, it does not generate it.

To the question, what kind of *niyama* is this *vyāpti*, Dharmakīrti answers by saying that it is an invariable/exceptionless rule (*avinābhava niyama*)⁵. We shall give the rationale for Dharmakīrti's acceptance of *vyāpti* as a *niyama*. But before we do this let us note a few points of distinction between Nyāya and Buddhism with regard to their treatment of the concept of *vyāpti*. On the Buddhist view the rule called *vyāpti* may indeed come to be disclosed in the *anvayī* or *vyatirekī* way but

4. *Pramāṇavārttika* III, pp. 31-32, also *Svārthanumānaparichheda*, pp. 12-13, 15-16.

5. *Pramāṇavārttika* III, pp. 31-32, also *Svārthanumānaparichheda*, pp. 13-14.

the rule that comes to be disclosed is the same, viz the rule called *vyāpti*. There are not, therefore, types of *vyāpti* on the Buddhist view, as they have come to be acknowledged on the Nyāya view. Also, whereas making a distinction between fashioning and formulating an argument on the one hand and communicating an already formulated argument on the other, Buddhist logicians seem to be right in distinguishing between *svārthanumāna* and *parārthanumāna*, this distinction seems to have been considered quite differently in the Nyāya tradition. Dharmakīrti acknowledges three principal kinds of arguments viz *svābhāva*, *kārya* and *anupalabdhi*. We shall discuss them towards the end of this chapter. From the first two kinds of arguments, if we can show one thing being naturally related with another, from the third, we can talk about an absence of a thing. As a contrast to this classification of arguments, the Nyāya classification of arguments into *anvayī*, *vyatirekī* and *anvaya - vyatirekī* seems difficult to defend. For, it seems to originate from the corresponding classification of *vyāpti* and if *vyāpti* is understood as a *niyama*, rather than a relation (*sambandha*) then since the *niyama* called *vyāpti* cannot be classified, arguments can also not be classified on the basis of the classification of *vyāpti*. In addition, Dharmakīrti probably wanted a sort of necessary connection to obtain between *hetu* (sign) and *sādhyā* (signified), perhaps because he wanted to avoid the contingencies of an inductive generalization based purely upon observation. This is underlined by his doctrine of natural invariance

(*svabhāva-pratibandha*) B K Matilal (1986) has given a very good account of the concept of 'natural invariance' to obtain between *hetu* and *sādhya*. He says

"It seems clear here that Dharmakīrti here was moving away from the notion of the purely empirical determination of the "invariance" relation between the inferential sign and the signified, such an invariance must be a *necessary* relation, based upon either a "natural" connection (*svabhāva*) or a "causal" connection (*kārya*). The natural connection is one where the two items are ontologically indistinguishable but epistemologically distinguishable being impermanent and being a product, being a tree and being a beech tree. The "causal" connection is one where the two items are both ontologically distinguishable and still such that one is the natural outcome of the other : smoke and fire "6

Vyāpti can be said to be a rule (*niyama*) regarding the natural invariance (*svabhāva pratibandha*) between sign (*hetu*) and signified (*sādhya*). But the question is 'If *vyāpti* is rule (*niyama*), how is it to be interpreted?' *Vyāpti* as a *niyama* is interpreted in a variety of ways. Many an alternative interpretation of *vyāpti* as a *niyama*, like 'co-existence' (*sāhacarya*) or simultaneity (*sahopalambha*), or necessity of transgression (*avyabhicāra*) or invariable/exceptionless rule (*avinābhāva-niyama*) is invoked in the process. Now we need to

6. Matilal, B.K. and Evans, R.D. (eds.) (1986) *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, p. 23.

consider as to which alternative is acceptable to Dharmakīrti and what is the rationale behind it. As we have already mentioned, Dharmakīrti understands *vyāpti* in terms of *avinābhāva-niyama*. This invariable rule governs only those types of relation between two terms which are of the nature of necessity, inevitability, exceptionlessness, universality etc. We shall now try to explicate the rationale of the invariable rule, as accepted by Dharmakīrti.

According to Dharmakīrti, mere accidentality of the two terms being found together (*sāhacarya*) through repeated observation (*bhuyodarsana*) cannot bring forth necessity which *vyāpti* as a rule must possess. Co-existence (*sāhacarya*) just implies that two terms or things (*hetu-sādhyā*) are found together. But just by finding them together, one cannot guarantee their being together invariably. Naiyāyikas interpret *vyāpti* in terms of *sāhacarya niyam* and *sāmānādhikaranyā-sambandha*?⁷ This relation (*sambandha*) is explained by Nyāya with the help of an example of relation between *prthvi* and *gandha*. But to say that there is a relation of *vyāpti* between *prthvi* and *gandha* is to give the kind of interpretation of *vyāpti*, where *vyāpti* can at most be said to obtain on the basis of being perceived together and not because *gandha* is the *svabhāva* of *prthvi*. Further, the *sāmānādhikaranyā-sambandha* of Nyāya needs to be understood as a relation and as a relation it can neither be promoted to the status of a rule nor

7. Uddyotakara; *Nyāyavārttika* I. i.5.

can it be substituted for it. Nyāya classifies *vyāpti* into three kinds, viz *anvayī*, *vyatirekī* and *anvaya-vyatirekī* which are supposed to give us three kinds of *anumāna*. But in the opinion of Dharmakīrti, *vyāpti* as a rule is uniformly applicable, no matter what kind of argument gets formulated and framed. Hence classification of *vyāpti* would not be available if it is understood in this sense. The Nyāya philosophers further contend that our cognition of *vyāpti* is derived from repeated observation (*bhūyodarsana*) of similar instances. Here universality of *vyāpti* remains questionable as generalization here is based on experience only.

Likewise, the interpretation of *vyāpti* in terms of *avyabhicāra nīyam* is also questionable. *avyabhicāra nīyam* interpretation of *vyāpti* is advocated by Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣikas. *avyabhicāra nīyam* means non-obtainability of one without the other. Consideration of this *nīyama* is though one of the important considerations, yet it cannot be equated with *vyāpti*. For according to Dharmakīrti, a feature (*dharma*) may be connected with a particular thing even naturally, but this cannot prove necessary relation to obtain between *hetu* and *sādhya*. Interpretation of *vyāpti* in terms of *anyathānupapatti* (impossibility of being given otherwise) is also not acceptable to Dharmakīrti on similar ground. This interpretation of *vyāpti* is advanced by the Jainas⁸. Saying that we have not noticed an

8. Durveka Mishra, *Hetu-bindu-tīkā-āloka* pp 308-323.

instance going contrary to our experience, makes *vyāpti* grounded in experience. And this can not make *vyāpti* an inevitable and exceptionless, universal rule.

From the above discussion we may dig out some important features of *vyāpti* as a rule, accepted by Dharmakīrti. *vyāpti* as a rule is *invariable* (*avinābhava*), *exceptionless* (*avyabhicāra*) and *necessary* (*avasyambhāva*). *Vyāpti* exhibits all these features and it is because of these features that we are able to comprehend the unique nature of *vyāpti* as an essential condition of *anumāna* as accepted by Dharmakīrti. If there is an invariance relation between *hetu* and *sādhya*, then it implies that if *hetu* is given then *sādhya* cannot fail to be given. The relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya* is interdependent. Given that there is prevader-prevaded relation between sign and signified through invariability, it so happens that it cannot even contingently be the case that sign is there but not the signified. This kind of relation between them is given to us at least on the level of coherent conceivability. Its actual instantiation need not be ruled out though it cannot be made its pre-condition as Naiyāyikas accept (perception is in the very base of inference). *Vyāpti* is exceptionless. It is exceptionless because necessity is built into it. Since *vyāpti* is a necessary rule, its exceptionlessness springs from itself. Thus, the two very important pillars of *anumāna*, viz *sādhya* and *hetu* are invariably, never failingly and necessarily connected to each other through *vyāpti* which is considered to be essential (regulative) condition of *anumāna*.

II

We have discussed in the preceding section the consideration of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* as the two essential conditions of *anumāna* and it is because of these two that we are able to fashion and formulate an argument. In this section we proceed to discuss the validity conditions of *anumāna*. In order that an indirect knowledge claim is a viable argument one must keep the following points in mind. Any indirect knowledge-claim is viable provided it is capable of being formulated with the help of a viable argument and that any argument is held to be formally viable provided it is at least valid. Thus considered, being *valid* is the minimum condition determinative of the viability of an argument as an instrument of indirect knowledge claim. The question which arises here is 'What is the validity of an argument determined by?' In Dharmakīrti's treatment of *anumāna*, *hetu* (sign) plays an important role. Dharmakīrti holds that validity of an argument is determined by the three important features which a *hetu* must possess. The three important features (*trirūpatva*) of *hetu* are *pakṣa sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *asapakṣa-asattva*. The formulation of the three fold features of *hetu* is generally ascribed to Buddhist logician Dignāga, but Professor Tucci in his *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic* has pointed that even the predecessor of Dignāga (who could be most probably Vasubandhu) was aware of it⁹. In the *Nyāyasūtras* there

9 *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, Gaekward Oriental Series, p. XIX.

is no reference to any such characteristics of *hetu*. But it mentions that both *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* may be based on *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*.¹⁰ The doctrine of the three fold features of *hetu* is but a direct corollary of *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* *hetu* as would clearly appear from the explanation of Vatsyayana¹¹, though he has not mentioned *trairūpya* in so many words. It is, however, interesting to note that Uddyotakara and following him many other Indian logicians have read five fold features of a *hetu* viz *paksasattva*, *sapakasattva*, *vipaksasattva*, *abādhitasattva*, and *asatpratipaksattva*.¹²

In order to avoid ambiguity and attain preciseness Dharmakīrti has put them in the following verse

*trairūpyam punar lingasyānumeyasattvān eva. Sapakṣa eva
sattvān Asapakṣe cāsattvameva niścītam*.¹³

[i.e. 'The three aspects of the mark are - just its presence in the object cognised by inference, its presence only in similar cases; its absolute absence in dissimilar cases is necessary'.]

Dharmottara in his commentary on the above observes that the word *niścīta* which occurs in the enumeration of the third

10 *Udāharanāsādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam hetuḥ tathā-vaidharmyāt Sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhavi dr̥ṣṭānta udāharanam tad viparyayaḥ va viparītam - Nyāyasūtra* 1.1, pp. 34-37

11. Vide *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the above sūtra (i.e. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1).

12. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5

13. *Nyāyabindu* II. 5.

characteristic of *hetu* should also be read in the first as well as in the second characteristic. By this he means that the *hetu* is not a *hetu* of the type which by its inherent capacity, is capable of causing inferential cognition as a seed produces sprout. No conclusion is possible if *hetu* is not known. We do not infer the existence of fire from smoke which is not observed by us. Thus the *hetu* of an inference is sharply distinguished from such *hetu* (cause), which by its mere presence produces an effect. In other words, smoke is not the *hetu* in the sense in which the seed is the *hetu* of the sprout. Thus the *hetu* of an inference is different from the *hetu* of the production of anything. Dharmottara has also discussed the appropriateness of *eva* in the above mentioned conditions. If the first would have been stated as *anumeye eva sattvam*, then an *asādharaṇa* (uncommon) *hetu* might have passed for a valid one. The second condition is to be read as *sapākṣa eva sattvam niścītam* iti. The significance of *niścītam* has already been pointed out. The position of *eva* after *sapākṣa* points out that a valid *hetu* should be present in *sapākṣa* alone and never in *vipākṣa*. If *eva* is put after *sattvam*, it would have meant that a valid *hetu* would be only present and by no means absent in the *sapākṣa*. The third condition (*asapākṣe cāsattvam eva niścītam*) is quite explicit. When *eva* is put after *sattvam* it is to be understood that there should always be the absence of the *hetu* from *vipākṣa* and thus it invalidates an inference like 'sound is produced after an effort because it is eternal' in which eternality is partly existent in *vipākṣa*.

We shall take an example of a valid inference and try to see how the three conditions of *hetu* gets fulfilled. By way of this, we can understand clearly what *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* mean. The example is as follows.

Sound is non-eternal

Because it is a product

All that is a product is non-eternal,

Like an earthen pot.

(or) All that is eternal is a non-product

Like space.

Here we infer the non-eternity of sound from its being a product, which is, therefore, the *hetu* in the particular argument. Now the *hetu*, the quality of being a product, is present in sound which is called the *pakṣa*, and thus it fulfils the first condition. The second feature of *hetu* is such that it must be present in the *sapakṣa*. *Sapakṣa* has been defined as what is analogous to *pakṣa* or subject on the ground of its possessing in generality the attribute to be proved of the *pakṣa*. In the above argument, an earthen pot, which is analogous to sound on the ground of its possessing the attribute of non-eternity, is *sapakṣa*.¹⁴ The third condition is that the *hetu* must be absent from the *vipakṣa*. The *vipakṣa* is heterogeneous to the *pakṣa* and stands in contrast with *sapakṣa* on the ground of its being different from or contradictory to, or implying negation of *sapakṣa*.¹⁵ In the instance stated above, space is *vipakṣa* because

14. *Nyāyabindu* II 9.

15. *ibid* II.10.

it is eternal, i e. it is opposite to what is non-eternal which is *sapaksa*. Thus, we find the *hetu*, the quality of being a product has satisfied the three conditions necessary to make the inference 'sound is non-eternal' valid.

The doctrine of *trirūpa-hetu* has been criticised thoroughly by Jaina logicians. Jaina logicians hold that even one characteristic i e. *anyathanupapatti*, alone is sufficient to make the *hetu* a valid one and also if this characteristic be wanting, the *hetu* cannot be valid inspite of the three-fold characteristic ¹⁶ Jaina logicians give the following example of a syllogism to prove their point

Maitra's son that is in the womb
(of his mother) is dark-complexioned.

Because he is a son of Maitra

Like the present sons of Maitra.

Here the *hetu*, the fact of being a Maitra's son is (i) present in the *paksa*, Maitra's son in the womb It is also (ii) present in the *sapaksa* and (iii) absent in the *vipaksa* Though the *hetu* has fulfilled the three conditions ascribed by the Buddhists, the conclusion of the above argument is obviously wrong. On the contrary, according to Jaina logicians, there are cases of valid *anumāna*, where *hetu* possesses only one or two conditions and not three as the Buddhist logicians would insist. For example, 'Śaśin is not non-Candra because it is known as Candra'. Though this is

16. nānyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim
anyathanupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim - *Tattva-*
Saṃgraha Kārikā, 1369

an example of a correct inference, yet it fulfils only two conditions and not three. Thus, even in the absence of the three-fold characteristic of the *hetu*, according to Jainas, the correct inference is possible. By both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (positive and negative arguments) it is proved that the doctrine of the three-fold characteristic of the *hetu* is faulty one and only characteristic of a valid *hetu* is *anyathānupapatti*, according to Jainas. *Anyathānupapatti* is understood as 'impossibility of being given otherwise'.

Buddhists reply to the objections raised by Jainas could be as follows. Let *anyathānupapatti* or *avinābhāva* i.e. concomitant relation between the attribute to be proved or the predicate of the thesis (*sādhya-dharma*) and the reason (*hetu*) be the only characteristic of the *hetu*. The question is where is this characteristic of the *hetu* to be ascertained? Three answers are possible to this question. Firstly, *hetu* is to be ascertained in the *sādhya-dharma* in general, secondly, it is to be ascertained in the *sādhya-dharmin* and thirdly, in the *dṛṣṭāntadharmin*. Let the *avinābhāvita* characteristic be ascertained in general in the predicate of the thesis (*sādhya-dharma*). But this is not plausible, for unless the concomitant relation between *hetu* and *sādhya dharma* (major term) is ascertained in respect of a particular *dharmin* (minor term), *anyathānupapatti* alone cannot establish a proposition. For example, visibility (*cākṣusatva*) is the *hetu* of non-eternity (*anityatva*) and they are inseparably related (*anyathānupapanna*), but this is absolutely useless when we are to establish the non-eternity of sound (*śabda*). Although

visibility is in general an invariable associate of non-eternity, it is by itself absolutely useless in this particular case, because visibility is not an attribute of sound and therefore does not prove its non-eternity. If to avoid this difficulty the relation of the *hetu* with the *dharman* is regarded as a necessary condition, the three-fold characteristic of the *hetu* is admitted. *Anyathānupapatti* of *hetu* is useless unless its *anvaya* i.e. *sapakṣa-sattva* (existence in the similar cases) and *vyatireka* i.e. *vipakṣasattva* (non-existence in the dissimilar cases) relations are pointed out. So in that case we have the three-fold characteristic in full. If it be the case that there is the presence of the *hetu* in the *sādhya-dharman*, this also will not enable us to solve the difficulty, for in that case it would be tantamount to the acceptance of the *tranṭyā* doctrine.

If we accept the second alternative that *anyathānupapatti* of *hetu* be determined in the *sādhya-dharman*, then the use of *hetu* becomes needless. The *sādhya* is proved by the same *pramāṇa* which proves the *hetu* inseparably connected with the *sādhya* and is determined in the *sādhya-dharman*. If again the *sādhya* is not proved, the *hetu* also is not proved, for according to Jainas, the *hetu* is inseparably connected with the *sādhya* and ascertained as such in the *sādhya-dharman*, and if the *sādhya* is not proved, the *hetu* which is to be ascertained in the *sādhya-dharman*, is also not proved. It may be said that the *sādhya* is proved by some different *pramāṇa*. But in that case what is the use of the *hetu*? The *hetu* is requisitioned for providing the *sādhya*. If

the *sādhya* is already proved, the *hetu* becomes useless. Again, if the *sādhya* is proved by the *hetu*, there will be the fallacy of *petitio-principii*. The proof of the *sādhya* is to depend on that of the *hetu*, as the *hetu* is intended for proving the *sādhya*. The proof of the *hetu*, in its turn, depends on that of the *sādhya*, as the *hetu* is invariably connected with the *sādhya*. So the fallacy of *petitio principii* is inevitable.

The third alternative, i.e. the *anyathānupapatti* is to be determined in the *dīṣṭānta*, is also not acceptable to the Buddhist. If the *anyathānupapatti* of the *hetu* be determined in the *dīṣṭānta dharmīn* independent of *sādhya dharmīn*, there will be no knowledge of *vyāpti* and hence, the *sādhya* cannot be proved by the *hetu*. It follows, thus, that in none of the three ways in which we can take *anyathānupapatti* characteristic of the *hetu*, it is faultless. Jain logicians' objection that even if the three conditions of *hetu* are satisfied in an argument, we cannot reach a correct conclusion, is futile. Jainas take help of the following syllogism to prove their point. 'The son of Maitra that is in the mother's womb is dark complexioned, because he is a son of Maitra like other sons of Maitra'. If we have a close look at this syllogism, we find that the *hetu* does not, in fact, possess the three-fold characteristic. That Maitra's son will be other than dark-complexioned cannot be refuted on any reasonable ground. So the condition of *vipaksasattva* is not satisfied in the above mentioned syllogism. Hence the above example of a fallacious syllogism with a *hetu* of three-fold character is untenable, for actually the *hetu* in question does not possess the three

necessary characteristics So, if there is a *hetu*, which possesses only one or two but lacks all the three characteristics, will be defective and will invalidate the conclusion

III

In this section, we shall discuss the classification of *anumāna* by Dharmakīrti and the basis of it We shall also briefly consider the reasons as to why Dharmakīrti is not prepared to accept classification of *anumāna* advocated by others Depending on the three distinct classificatory features a *hetu* has, *anumāna* is classified into three kinds, according to Dharmakīrti Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* has spelt out three types of *hetu*, which makes *anumāna* legitimate Such classificatory features of *hetu*, according to Dharmakīrti, are

- (i) *Svabhāva* that *hetu* may be of the same nature as *sādhyā*
The *hetu* 'because it is possessed of the nature of an oak' (*śimsapavrkṣa*), adduced to establish the conclusion that 'it is possessed of the nature of a tree (*vrkṣa*)' is an instance of *svabhāva hetu*,¹⁷
- (ii) that *hetu* may be of the nature of *kārya* of the *kāraṇa* which is *sādhyā* The *hetu* 'because the smoke rises from the hill' advanced to establish the conclusion that there is fire on the hill', is an instance of *kārya-hetu*,¹⁸

17 Svabhāvo svasattāmātrabhāvinī sādhyadharme hetuḥ Yathā vrkṣo'yam śimsapatvad iti *Nyāyabindu* II 15-16

18. Kāryam yathā vahnir atra dhumād iti. *ibid* II.17.

(iii) That *hetu* may just not be obtained actually The *hetu* 'because (though all the conditions necessary for the perception of a jar are present there) the jar is not perceived there' adduced to establish the conclusion that there is no jar there' is an instance of *anupalabdhi-hetu*.¹⁹ Given these features, we get three principal kinds of *anumāna*, viz *svabhāvanumāna*, *kāryānumāna* and *anupalabdhi-anumāna* When we know something indirectly, we may know it to be of the nature of something already known, or as a *kāraṇa* of it or else find it absent because something else is absent.

In *Anupalabdhi-anumāna* we cognise absence of something else indirectly *Anupalabdhi* (non-obtainability) of a thing is instrumental to the determination of absence of something else, provided their absences are connected with each other necessarily Devacarya, the Jain philosopher, writes in *Syādvādaratnākara* that *anupalabdhi* is a case of essential identity (*īdātmya* or *svabhāva*) and so, therefore, there is no need for the investigation of the basis of its necessity and universality²⁰ Dharmakīrti has discussed varieties of *anupalabdhi-anumāna* in *Nyāyabindu*

19. *tatrānupalabdhir yathā na pradesavisese kvacid ghatah upalabdhi laksanaprapṭ asyanupalabdher iti. ibid. II 12*

20. *Anupalabdheḥ punaḥ svabhāvahetarantar bhāvan na tatra prthag avinābhavagrahaka pramanacintetī. Syādvādaratnākara p. 514.*

However, we do not intend to enter into the detailed discussion. *svabhāvānumāna* and *kāryānumāna*, in which *svabhava* and *kārya* *hetus* are used, are also classifiable in accordance with certain kind of classificatory features of *hetu*

Let us now turn to the reactions of Dharmakīrti on the classification of *anumāna* by Nyāya philosophers. Gautama has classified *anumāna* into three types, viz *pūrvavat*, *'śesavat* and *sāmānyatodrsta*.²¹ Vātsyāyana²² interprets and understands *pūrvavat* as that kind of *anumāna*, where we have a prior knowledge of effect on the basis of perception of its cause. By *'śesavata* he means a posterior knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effect. *Sāmānyatodrsta* means cognition of one thing on the basis of another which is not commonly seen. Dharmakīrti objects to this classification of *anumāna* on the following grounds. Firstly, behind this classification, it is presupposed that inference could be known only through cause-effect relationship. This is a questionable claim. Secondly, according to Dharmakīrti, *anumāna* need not proceed from the perceived to the unperceived as valid inferences are legitimate without the backing of perception.

Uddyotakara²³ gives another classification of *anumāna*. He seems to hold that the classification of *anumāna* into *kevalānvayī*,

21 *Nyāyasūtras* I 1 5

22 *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I 1 5

23. *Nyāyavārttika* I 1.5

CHAPTER - VI

Concluding Remarks

We now conclude with a recapitulation of the main points made so far about the general framework of the theory of *anumāna* by Dharmakīrti and also with a few words regarding the general implications of the theory under consideration.

Dharmakīrti could perhaps be said to be a logician *par excellence* in the sense that prior to him in the history of Indian logic *anumāna* hardly received such a comprehensive, varied, consistent and detailed treatment. His profound insight into the problem concerning *anumāna* is revealed in his consideration of the nature and significance of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* as crucial conditions in defining it and *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu* as its constitutive conditions.

With respect to the epistemological aspect of *anumāna*, we saw that 'inference for oneself' (*svārthanumāna*) is an epistemological basis and foundation such that every major consideration concerning *anumāna* must be available and discussed primarily with reference to it. For except communication of an already formulated argument and problems incidental to it, 'inference for others' (*parārthanumāna*) brings-forth no consideration concerning *anumāna* which is novel or which arises at its level for the first time. One may say here that 'inference for oneself' constitutes an epistemic womb of the discussion of all the major aspects of *anumāna*. Hence, according to

Dharmakīrti, 'inference for others' is basically linguistic in character while 'inference for oneself' is epistemic in nature. It is by taking this aspect into account that we were interested in understanding its nature and role as epistemic conditions of *anumāna*.

We observed in the last chapter that *anumāna* is that comprehension of the inferable which arises from *trairūpya-hetu* and is indicative of obtainability or non-obtainability of an object. The kinds of *hetu* are *svabhāva*, *kārya* and *anupalabdhi*. Of them, the first two are instrumental to proving obtainability of a thing, while the third of non-obtainability. A thing can indicate another only if it is connected with it through a natural tie (*svabhāva pratibandha*) and such a tie determining relations are *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*. According to Dharmakīrti, in a valid argument form, a *hetu* must fulfil three necessary and sufficient conditions - *anumeye sattvam*, *sapakse sattvam* and *vipakṣe asattvam*.

Unlike Dignāga, Dharmakīrti does not count *pakṣa* and *dṛṣṭānta* as constituents of *anumāna*. In fact, he goes on to argue that *dṛṣṭānta* is not an independent constituent at all. It is with the help of the fulfilment of necessary conditions of *hetu* together with its specific kind and through the *hetu-sādhya* relation called *vyāpti* that we are in a position to prove obtainability or otherwise of an object. *Vyāpti* means *avinābhāva nīyam*. The relation of *vyāpti* is not between objects themselves but is explicative of the *vyāpya-vyāpaka bhāva* between *sādhya* and *hetu*. In other words, mere *vyāpti* in itself is unable to prove

obtainability or otherwise of an object, unless it is fortified and supplemented by the above mentioned conditions.

The issue of validity becomes relevant only in three frameworks of *anumāna*, viz. *svabhāvanumāna*, *kāryānumāna* and *anupalabdhi anumāna*. Such an issue could be discussed and decided one way or the other only on the basis of the consideration of those, which are determinative of it. Thus, on the count of validity, *trirūpaḥetu* together with *vyāpti* and deduction are most important. In the case of *svabhāvanumāna* we have set-subset relation. It is generative or causal relation that determines *kāryānumāna*. In *anupalabdhi anumāna*, the conclusion gives us the information that a particular object is non-obtainable. *Tādātmya* brings to our notice a unitary character of both *sādhyā* and *hetu*, while *tadutpatti* is important in bringing to our notice two important features of non-permanent things, viz. simultaneity and succession. As explained earlier, according to Dharmakīrti, there are three important necessary and sufficient conditions a *hetu* is required to satisfy in any argument. Accordingly, non-fulfilment of any one of them will make an argument fallacious and invalid.

In the present work we have tried to explicate the general format of *anumāna* as developed by Dharmakīrti. Towards this end, adequate care has been taken to present the nature of inference within the epistemological, conceptual and philosophical framework of Dharmakīrti's thoughts. Our enquiry started by giving a historical introduction to the problem of inference. Prior to Dignāga in Buddhist as well as in non-Buddhist tradition inference was treated as a second source of knowledge, second in order and

preference after perception. This treatment of inference was probably based on the ground that perception gives us an immediate knowledge of things and also supplies the data of inference. The view that inference is always preceded by perceptual knowledge was criticized by the Buddhist logicians. According to Dharmakīrti, both perception as well as inference are equally important in their respective spheres. Perception is the direct source of knowledge which cognizes only the direct reality, the ultimate particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), it can never cognize the indirect or generalized (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). On the other hand, inference is an indirect mode of cognition, which can cognize only the indirect reality - that which is constructed and generalized. It can never cognize the direct reality, the ultimate particular.

In Dharmakīrti's view the entire field of human knowledge consists of two basic constituents. *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and hence any worthwhile enquiry into the nature and structure of human knowledge has to concentrate on them. It is consistently insisted by Dharmakīrti that necessary and sufficient conditions of the occurrence of perceptual and inferential cognitions respectively need to be differently formulated and stipulated, so that the necessary and sufficient conditions of one sort of cognition do not turn out to be identical with those of the other and the very distinction between direct and indirect cognitions does not come to be obliterated.

Such an approach explains our separate treatment of *svalakṣaṇa* in Chapter II. Against the background of the Nyāya

theory according to which knowledge of the same object may be acquired by both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, Dharmakīrti's insistence on the different objects of knowledge cognized by *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* should be clearly understood. It is not that there are two different ways of knowing the same thing, but it is asserted by him that these are two distinct methodological and cognitive approaches to apprehend two distinct orders of reality. Corresponding to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admission of two different categories of *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya*, we have *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* in Dharmakīrti's view. But the Buddhist logician holds that unless two logically distinct methods of knowing them are accepted, the latter becomes distinct only in a logically uninteresting manner. Hence, in Dharmakīrti's works we find detailed treatment of *svalakṣaṇa* in order to bring into sharp relief its distinction from *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*. Besides, in Indian philosophy Dharmakīrti for the first time, expounded the notion of ultimate particular.

The Buddha is said to have explored two sorts of truths : *paramārtha-sat* and *saṃvṛtti-sat* and the respective objects of perception and inference, namely, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* are said to be correspondingly connected with them. If successful human action (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*) in our life could be said to be its major goal as Dharmakīrti acknowledges this to be in the beginning of *Nyāyabindu*, and if indirect cognition has any bearing upon it, then his theory of inference as an enquiry into indirect knowledge, too has to have a bearing upon it.

The two sorts of truths mentioned above may be understood in two different ways. First, as truths pertaining to two different sorts of objects in which case they would not be connected. Accordingly they would remain compartmentalized. This view seems to have been favoured by Dignāga. Secondly, they could be held to be two modes of comprehension of features which objects have, given that objects may have sharable and/or non-sharable features. Dharmakīrti seems to favour this alternative. Accordingly possibility of convergence of direct and indirect cognitions on the same object, instead of being ruled out in advance, would have to be kept open.

The theory under consideration has been worked out and elaborated in its various aspects within the framework and on the background that the knowledge in general must fulfil the conditions (or criteria) of it, viz. *avisamvādatva* (non-contradictoriness), *avijñātārthaprakāśakatva* (characteristic of novelty) and *vyavahartavyatva* (serviciability). Since inference is the domain of indirect knowledge, its consideration too cannot disregard the above conditions of knowledge.

There are two opposing views regarding the formalisability of Buddhist logic. Whereas scholars like Douglas D. Daye¹ argue that it is not a formal system, scholars like H. Nakamura and J.F.

1 Daye, D.D. (1977) "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal description of Buddhist logic, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Vol. 18, p. 231. Also Daye (1986) "On translating the term "drstanta" in early Buddhist Formal Logic", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp 147-156.

Staal assert that it is Daye maintains that " ... the descriptive utility of mathematical logic with early Indian logic texts has simply been overrated", and although the Indian logic texts contain metalogical rules for evaluating the "legitimacy or illegitimacy" of arguments, they do not clearly explicate the criteria to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments, and that "... Buddhist logic is not deductive, nor can it be formally valid, nor is it an inference". In contrast, H Nakamura² and J.F Staal³ hold the view that Buddhist logic bears very close similarities to syllogistic forms and that it can be represented and analysed by standard deductive techniques. However it may be conceded that various attempts at reconstructing the Buddhist logic in terms of a formal system are at the moment in a rather tentative stage.

In this context it may be observed that the Buddhist theory of inference should be seen from the perspective that in order to achieve a more satisfactory understanding of human reasoning, the analysis of logical processes must be made within a general theory of cognition. This is not an attempt to advocate unwarranted appeal to psychologism but to assign epistemological and psychological aspects their due place in a general theory of

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2. Nakamura, H. (1958) "Buddhist logic expounded by means of symbolic logic", *Indokaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu*, pp. 375-395.
 3. Staal, J F.. (1958) "Means of Formalization of Indian and Western Thought", *Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Proceedings of the XII International Congress of Philosophy, Venice

inference. The way Anscombe⁴ argued that adequate understanding of human acts must precede their just moral evaluation, one may suggest that the epistemological and psychological issues must be clearly understood before sound logical principles could be formulated.

In sum, the present study is an attempt to offer a framework to understand Dharmakīrti's theory of inference and bring out some of the most significant features of it. The main justification for this study lies in the fact that although Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabīndu* is a significant work in Indian logic, it has not received the scholarly attention due to it. There is need for deeper and fuller inquiries into the various aspects of Dharmakīrti's work in order that it can be assigned its due place in the history of Indian philosophy.

4 Anscombe, G E M (1981) "Modern Moral Philosophy", reprinted in *Ethics, Religion and Politics*, Vol. 3 of her *Collected Papers*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

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